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FBIS-EEU-95-125 *27 June 1996*

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Albania: Berisha's Meeting With Macedonia's Crvenkovski Viewed

AU2606165096 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 26 Jun 96 p 8

[Commentary by Abdulla Kepi: "Why in Crans-Montana?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The respected 35-year-old Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski was perhaps surprised to find himself at a special meeting with Mr. Sali Berisha, the president of Albania, because he has been waiting for his Albanian counterpart, Mr. Meksi, in Skopje for the past year. In order to achieve this meeting to the benefit of the two neighboring countries, Mr. Crvenkovski issued his first invitation to the Albanian prime minister when Mr. Pjeter Arbnori was in the Macedonian capital last year. His invitation was subsequently addressed in writing to the Foreign Ministry, and the media on both sides of the border confirmed the Albanian prime minister's coming visit to Skopje. The visit was first to take place on 15 January, then on 28 January, and finally on 4 February. However, the Albanian prime minister did not turn up in Skopje in January, February, or even in March. He did not even go after the conference of defense ministers held in Tirana at which Meksi himself, NOVA MAKEDONIJA reported, asserted to Macedonian Defense Minister Handziski that his arrival in Skopje was a matter of days.

Now, as Albanian Radio-Television reports, it is Mr. Sali Berisha, the president of the Republic of Albania, who has set aside a long and special meeting for the Macedonian prime minister. During their conversation (as reported by Albanian Radio-Television), the Macedonian prime minister congratulated the Albanian president on his victory in the 26 May elections (as if they had been presidential elections rather than elections for the People's Assembly). Of course, Berisha is in need of congratulations of this kind, and this is why he took the plane to Crans-Montana. But why congratulations from Branko Crvenkovski? Why congratulations from Macedonia when it is well known that Albanian-Macedonian relations have experienced a long and unrelieved two-year-long chill? One can understand the state of Albanian-Macedonian relations from the fact that not a single protocol of agreement has been signed by these two neighboring countries for more than one year. If we remember Berisha's sudden reversals of foreign policy, we may logically expect the same as what happened with Greece following the release of the five members of the Greek minority to occur in the case of Macedonia too. Berisha knows very well that old wheat can be brought from Macedonia sooner than it takes to harvest the new wheat in Albania. Six months ago, Macedonia sent to Albania about 30,000 quintals of wheat. Moreover, Berisha also stands in need of moral support first of all from such neighboring countries as Greece, Italy, and Macedonia. To visit your next-door neighbor but one, you need to pass through your neighbor's yard.

But what does Macedonia want from Albania? Its Achilles heel is its own Albanians. If Meksi did not go to Skopje, one of the reasons is that he would have had to tell the Albanians in Macedonia to behave themselves. Such a thing, while it would please the Macedonians, would annoy the Albanians. In Skopje, Meksi or any other senior Albanian official would be obliged to directly confront the accumulated problems of the Albanians in Macedonia such as higher education, the use of their mother tongue, the recognition of the Albanians as an essential part of the Macedonian state, and so forth, what stand would these officials take, for instance, if they were asked about Tetovo University, which they have so far officially supported? However, 2,000 km away from Albania and Macedonia in Crans-Montana, "agreement" seems easier. There, Berisha can "pull the strings" as much as he needs.

Albania: Socialist Press on Berisha's 'Political Debacle'

AU2606165396 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 26 Jun 96 p 8

[Commentary by G. Goti: "From the Heat of Tirana to the 'Humidity' of Crans-Montana"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Crans-Montana forum was created a few years ago with the principal aim of becoming a point of contact and exchange between East and West and between Europe and Asia, especially in the new historical situation since 1989. Several meetings that were not without interest took place, especially at the beginning, when opposition representatives were also invited. The media coverage is especially good. However, without denying its merits and those of its president, Mr. Carteron, the view exists that this forum now finds it hard to compete with its Swiss competitor, the World Economic Forum at Davos. At the latter, more than 1,500 business and political leaders of the highest caliber meet every year at the beginning of February. Albania was first represented in 1991 by Fatos Nano, who made an impression with his speech. Nevertheless, President Berisha no doubt felt relieved to receive the invitation from his friend Carteron to spend a few days in lovely mountain-girt Crans-Montana. Not only would he at least have the opportunity for a change of air after the heat and

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electoral confusion of Tirana, but he might even be able to "wangle" some congratulations over his "historic victory," which might bring down the scorching political temperature. Albanian Radio-Television immediately ran to his assistance, and announced that Berisha was going to Crans-Montana, to the annual summit of leaders of politics and business. Everybody saw that its report bore no relation to reality, as did Berisha himself when he saw the program and the list of guests. True, the well-known Zbigniew Brzezinski and Holbrooke were there, and also the two presidents of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, but these had nothing to do with Berisha. Crvenkovski, the respected prime minister of Macedonia, was also present, but Berisha could meet him perfectly easily on the shores of Lake Ohrid, where they could even enjoy one of the rare Lake Ohrid trout. It was immediately apparent that "the political market" offered little chance of "congratulations" on his victory. This was Berisha's first disappointment.

However, we cannot blame Crans-Montana for this. As we know, the 21 leaders of Arab countries were in Cairo, the EU's 15 political bosses were in Florence, and the European parliamentarians who lay down the law over the continent, even with their "advice," were in Brussels and Strasbourg. Where could Carteron find leaders that day, especially when Yeltsin had canceled his visit to the G-7 meeting? The fact that Berisha was in practice the most senior statesman to honor Crans-Montana with his presence can be of little consolation to him.

However, this was not the end to his disappointments. Even before he moved into his luxurious apartment, his aides brought him the resolution that had just been approved in Strasbourg asking him to repeat the elections. Berisha knows well the weight and decisive importance of the European Parliament, and the fresh air and greenery of Crans-Montana and the luxuriousness of his apartment could not bring the sparkle back to his eyes. The meeting with Swiss Foreign Minister Cotti, currently OSCE chairman, brought a shred of hope. But here Berisha was not in a position to obey even the routine protocol of "I said to him" and "he said to me," and our television provided us only with Berisha putting himself forward and talking about legal niceties. The respected Cotti mentioned four years of achievements (n.b.: four years, no more) and nothing else.

Under these circumstances, it was clear that the panel on Albania would no longer be what it was in the past, a platform for boasting about the "miracles" of the Albanian economy. It would become a trial of the farce of 26 May. This is indeed what happened. Although Carteron's stage management took care of the smallest details of protocol, and assembled a few conservatives whom we have seen at the rallies of Berisha and Shehu in Tirana, and the odd observer whom nobody knows, the auditorium where Berisha spoke was cold and indifferent, and not even one of the deputy chairmen of the OSCE Assembly could warm it by promising that there will supposedly be a report evaluating the Albanian elections as fair. On the contrary, the hint of a "civil war" among the respected institutions of the OSCE seems to have left a bitter taste among the audience in the hall. This explains why it emptied. Our politicians err if they imagine that these reputable institutions are like the political parties of Godo or Selfo, which go wherever the presidential wind blows. In the statements he made at this panel, recalling the language of the dictatorship, Berisha put his foot in his own mouth.

However, this was not an end to the "accidents" that befell Mr. Berisha and his entourage. While he was telling his audience about his exploits on 26 May, Mr. Nazarbayev, the president of Kazakhstan, and Mr. Akayev, the president of Kyrgyzstan, were being honored by the forum with a special prize from its presidium. Euronews broadcast this impressive ceremony live, and it would have been nice if our television had done so, too, because we would all have learned a good deal. In their speeches, the two presidents mentioned only the future. There was not a word about the opposition, let alone criticism and malediction, and they modestly praised the great idea of cooperation with Europe as the basis of peace and stability. Carteron, handing over the prizes, astonishingly invited the audience to spend their summer vacations in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in order to learn from their experience. Berisha's cup was full. Albania, so far the first among equals, was now at the bottom of the list. The visit to Crans-Montana became another great political debacle in every sense, and Crans-Montana not only did Berisha's health no good, but, up there in the Alpine fresh air, Berisha was almost choked by the political humidity that had accompanied him on his journey. Homesick for the heat of Tirana, he returned home one day early without any farewell protocol and without waiting for the forum to end its proceedings. Perhaps he did the right thing.

Albania: Opposition Said Ready To Compromise on Election Issue

AU2706093396 Tirana POLI I QENDRES in Albanian 26 Jun 96 p 3

[Commentary by P. Gjoni: "The Solution Lies in Albania"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The international reports, conclusions, opinions, and recommendations about the 26

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May elections and the further fate of the electoral process in Albania are very important for the unambiguous reestablishment of democracy on European lines. The bell tolls for those who have ears to hear, and the deafest are those who refuse to listen because they imagine that they can still palm off this electoral farce on Europe and the United States. The government top dogs in Albania may be for the moment pleased that Europe and the United States, while not giving the farce of 26 May their blessing, have at the same time not unequivocally rejected it and have so to speak left the ball in the Albanian court in order to see whether the Albanians themselves will be ready and able to properly put matters straight. Those government politicians who only see one side of the coin and imagine that "we have again pulled a fast one" will soon run up against the wall of Europe and the United States and provoke a response of major dimensions. Other government politicians who at once start to sincerely act on European and U.S. recommendations will have the chance, now that Albania has become the focus of international attention, to quickly erase the image created by the damaging publicity given to our country after 26 May, and to spread as never before the positive image of a country and people able to correct their mistakes and to move ahead. The "ball" has been thrown to Albania. The solution lies in Albania, but is hard to grasp. Democratic Alliance General Secretary Arben Imami said again in the press that dialogue requires the participation of President Berisha and cooperation between him and the political parties. The liberal-democratic opposition not only has no prejudices, but is ready for any compromise that leads to a restoration of confidence in free elections and to holding these elections as soon as possible. The situation is that the Democratic Party has won, but the opposition has not lost. All the different players have different cards and powers at their disposal. The question is of not allowing these powers to run together on a collision course, but making them recognize each other and work for the common good. Where the path of dialogue has been blocked by intransigent individuals who demand "all or nothing," it will be a good idea to open the road by pushing away those who are obstructing dialogue. Of course, the different sides cannot choose each other's representatives, but this matter must be settled within the parties in order not to forgo the results of dialogue.

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Bulgaria: BSP's Premyanov Departs for PASOK Congress

AU2606135596 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 0900 GMT 26 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] On 26 June, Krasimir Premyanov, Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] Supreme Council deputy chairman, departed for Athens, where he will take part in an extraordinary Panhellenic Socialist Movement [PASOK] congress, which begins tomorrow.

At Sofia airport, Mr. Premyanov said that the invitation was a result of the priority relations between the two parties. He views the PASOK congress as a suitable occasion for updating the joint ideas on developing the Balkans, the policy conducted by the two parties in the specific condition of every country, and the situation in the Balkans.

Answering a journalist's question, BSP Deputy Chairman Premyanov stated that he intended to request official information on the thesis circulated by certain circles regarding the existence of a Pomak nationality.

[Begin Premyanov recording] The BSP has a clear position on this matter. As a parliamentary majority and government, we cannot accept that this is the official position of the Greek authorities. There is no Pomak nation. There are Bulgarians who profess the Muslim religion. I think that this position should be acceptable and beneficial for the Greek side. I am deeply convinced that Greece, with its strong foreign policy, cannot allow such a personal position to become the official Greek position. [end recording]

Bulgaria: RDP, New Choice, Zhelev Discuss Coalition

AU2606160196 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1400 GMT 26 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] A consolidation of the liberal formations in Bulgaria may be expected in the autumn. This became known following a meeting between President Zhelyu Zhelev and representatives of New Choice and the Radical Democratic Party outside the Union of Democratic Forces. Dimitur Ludzhev, Asparukh Panov, and Ruslan Semerdzhiev informed the head of state that a series of consultations is beginning with representatives of liberal formations, with the idea of forming a free coalition to offer a new alternative to the present bipolar model in the country.

We are not against cooperating with the opposition, and will work in support of its united single presidential candidate, Petur Stoyanov, but such cooperation should not be interpreted as unification with our taking a minor role, Dimitur Ludzhev and Asparukh Panov told journalists, and they were quick to explain that today's meeting with President Zhelev should not be understood as indicating that they may nominate him as a candidate in the autumn presidential elections.

Zhelyu Zhelev supported the idea of forming a free coalition of liberal parties and formations, Dimitur Ludzhev said, but we will discuss the idea whether he should lead the coalition when it has been formed.

Bulgaria: Labor Leader Explains Postponement of Protests

AU2606130796 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 24 Jun 96 p 7

[Interview with Konstantin Trenchev, leader of the Podkrepa Labor Confederation, by Bozhidar Subev; place and date not given: "Government Has No Winning Move"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Subev] Dr. Trenchev, why did you postpone the wave of protests to the fall?

[Trenchev] There are many factors. On the one hand, the season is not very suitable because of the heat, the European Soccer Championship, and the Olympic Games. On the other hand, the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria [KNSB] is not very eager to continue the wave of protests, despite the fact that its members are also affected by the crisis and the destruction. Finally, the political forces also favor a slight postponement of the massive attack against the government.

I have always claimed that Podkrepa is sufficiently strong to appear alone in the arena. The question is whether the others will follow us, because the problems are of a national character.

[Subev] Does it mean that you are giving the cabinet a chance to gain control over the situation?

[Trenchev] No. The government simply does not have a winning move. The last hope of the rulers is to receive money from abroad, but this money will be used for paying the foreign debt. No money will remain in Bulgaria, and there will be no breath of oxygen for our economy. In addition, it appears that the harvest will be very poor. I am also concerned by the banking system's collapse, because it prompts an ever stronger reaction abroad.

[Subev] Recently you warned about the danger of declaring an emergency situation.

[Trenchev] Actually, this is the only manner in which this government could cool the hot autumn that awaits

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it. Podkrepa has gotten ahold of documents in which it is pointed out, albeit indirectly, that such measures could not be excluded. However, I already doubt that under the conditions in which we are living, and which constantly deteriorate, there could be something to stop the people's discontent.

[Subev] What sort of transition failed in Bulgaria?

[Trenchev] Since the beginning of 1995, there has been no transition in Bulgaria. There is stagnation and a waste of time. You cannot feed the people with plenums.

Regardless of how much this cabinet is being reproached for governing in a "rightist" manner, this is not true. To have a rightist government, you must first have decentralization of the state, and release the people and collective entities from the government's total control. Precisely the opposite is happening. This does not mean that the government has effected a leftist transition. The principles of imposing total control over all spheres of life, including private life, which have been inherited from the past, have failed completely. The last no-confidence vote [in which several opposition members sided with the cabinet] showed that there are politicians who continue to profess the principle "the worse it gets the better it is." However, we must forget this principle. We are all, and even our society as a structure, threatened by the destruction.

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Czech Republic: Kucan, Havel on Role of European Presidents

96CH0129A Prague TYDEN in Czech 3 Jun 96 p 35

[Interview with Milan Kucan, president of Slovenia, and Vaclav Havel, president of the Czech Republic, by Adam Cerny and Martin Ehl; place and date not given: "A President Is Primarily a Citizen"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *For historically unstable Central Europe, the way out and the solution is its integration into European structures in the economic, political, as well as security sense, Slovene President Milan Kucan told TYDEN on the conclusion of his sojourn in Prague. The interview was also participated in by President Vaclav Havel, who also expressed his views on some of the questions.*

[TYDEN] What is the contribution made by small nations in Central Europe to the future stability of this region, as well as Europe as a whole, and what could it be?

[Kucan] Regarded from the historical standpoint, this is an unstable part of Europe. It is the birthplace of conflicts that were even of worldwide extent. After World War II, the border between the European west and the European east ran through this region. Mutual interconnection is, thus, not only in the interest of those countries that are applying for membership in European integrational structures, but is also the focus of interest of those countries that are already members of these structures and that are interested in membership on the part of countries and peoples with similar cultural and civilizational traditions. A renewed partition into countries that belong in integrated structures and other countries would mean a new partition of Europe and would be to the detriment of both sides.

[TYDEN] New states, such as the Czech Republic and Slovenia, are gradually establishing good relationships with their neighbors. If we speak of these relationships, it could, for example, be possible to find parallels between Slovene-Italian relationships and Czech-German relationships. What is the basis for good neighborly relationships in a fragmented Europe?

[Kucan] The only parallel between Slovene-Italian and Czech-German relationships is the fact that both types of relationships originated as a result of World War II. Any kind of additional analogies—political ones, legal ones, or historical ones—are not significant. Of course, insofar as human fate is concerned, one could debate this. But we must also bear in mind that these problems were the result of World War II and that this war was something that people did not want, something that was not ethical. And it is particularly in this ethical sense that we can state that the war had a woeful impact on the entire population of Europe. It is, therefore, a question as to whether additional blame or additional ethical wrongdoings might surface if we were to return matters to the time before the outbreak of the war. It is in the interest of peace and stability with regard to the European countries and nations for us to accept the way Europe looks since World War II. What is the most we can do? We can consistently promote that which was contained in the Helsinki Final Act.

[TYDEN] Slovenia is facing elections in December. Prior to our elections, Czech President Vaclav Havel adopted a relatively activist attitude, and he rejects the contention of some critics that this is not required of him by the Constitution. Does a president have the right to "be a citizen" and to actively participate in political life, even over and above his prescribed duties? What attitude will you adopt prior to the elections in your country?

[Kucan] Much like the attitude adopted by President Havel. The president is primarily a citizen. He is a guarantor of constitutional regulations, but, at the same time, also of moral values. As a result of his reflections as well as his perception of moral values, he sometimes takes the risk that he will be criticized for such positions. But this is a conscious decision, bearing in mind all possible consequences resulting from a democratic society.

[TYDEN] Mr. President, you were elected as a result of direct voting and, therefore, you need not have the same political orientation as your government. What is most important in terms of the president maintaining correct relationships with the government without regard as to whether he agrees or disagrees with its focus?

[Kucan] On the one hand, this question can be highly academic and, on the other hand, highly specific. This is not merely a question of whether the president is correct or whether he is tolerant with respect to the government or not. It is also a matter of the government being correct and tolerant with respect to the president. What is basic is whether both of these constitutional factors—both the government and also the president—maintain a correct relationship with their state as such.

[TYDEN] The Czech-Slovene relationship can be considered to be an example of collaboration between two republics in this region. What is it that brings these two states together and what role in this is played by personal relationships between the highest representatives of both states?

[Kucan] There are numerous starting points here. That which is most important are the cultural and spiritual tra-

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ditions, membership in the same spiritual area in which collective and individual values are created—those values that are independent of social systems, values that are permanent, and values that are permanently binding upon man. All of this creates common views of the future, of the need for European cooperation, of the need for even small and smaller nations to preserve their identity. It is very important for us within the framework of European integration in the economic area to also prove capable of evaluating and intensifying our individuality in the area of culture, in the area of spiritual values, and in the area of spiritual forms. The views of the future can be verified only through continuously conducted dialogue. I perceive the role of the presidents as a task for people who are also expected to help open the borders and doors between individual states and nations.

[Box, p 35]

[Havel] A sense for consensus, for agreement, a sense for tolerance, is characteristic of the relationship between the president and the government. I am not in a position in which I would have a fundamentally different political orientation than the government, but should such a situation ensue, then it would be most important for the president to know how to conduct a dialogue with the government and how to seek consensus in matters in which there may be differing views. In my opinion, the task of a president in European parliamentary systems is to bridge the time governments are alternating and to be a guarantor of state continuity.

[Box, p 35]

[Havel] The frequency of personal contacts among political leaders is immensely important and is one of the good achievements of this era. During the previous century, heads of states or empires met, say, perhaps only once in a lifetime. Presidents have their specific task of creating a psychologically favorable climate in which the governments then operate and conclude specific treaties.

[Box, p 35]

[Havel] Good cooperation among neighbors must have several points of departure. The first starting point is a sincere desire to look into the future and not to revive the past in anything but a reflexive form. A second point is the clear awareness that if one demon is released, then tens of others will be evoked. Another point of departure is the common sharing of the principles of a civic society and of civic coexistence among peoples of various nationalities and nations. Yet another point of departure is respect for the individuality of others, of their culture, of their traditions. And the final point of departure is the awareness of the interconnection of our fates. In today's civilization, this is true worldwide, it is doubly true of Europe and triply so with reference to Central Europe. The latter is a multinational area in which every minority still contains another minority.

Czech Republic: Commentary on Klaus's Political Faults

96CH0127B Prague NOVA PRITOMNOST in Czech No 5, 1996 p 25

[Commentary by Petr Prihoda: "L'etat, C'est Moi—A Portrait of Vaclav Klaus"]

[FBIS Translated Text] To claim that healthy self-confidence is smugness is nonsense, according to Jan Patocka (DENNI TELEGRAF, 19 September 1994) as he uses this phrase to target Klaus's critics. In his judgment, it was precisely the Czech prime minister who returned that healthy self-confidence to Czech society.

This can be contended only with considerable license. Czech society is characterized by many factors, but it does not have a healthy amount of self-confidence (let us not confuse this with boastfulness). But Vaclav Klaus did provide hope—to at least a significant portion of this society.

Toward the end of 1989, the following graffiti inscription was found on the walls of the streets of Prague: "Under Komarek, the koruna will be like the German mark." This amiable illustration of the Gellner thesis (NOVA PRITOMNOST, No. 3, 1996), namely that communism was liquidated by consumer thinking, errs only in its designation of the sponsor of the long-yearned-for change: It is not attributed to Valtr Komarek, but to the self-confident and smiling jolly good chap Vaclav Klaus, who knows how to go about it. He will "take care of it," as the soul of a substantial portion of the people believes. This is the source of Klaus's charisma, which is strengthened by journalistic adulation (see the television film by Igor Chaun entitled "The Klaus Cure").

That which gave rise to Klaus the economist was an enormous effort to liberate economics as an autonomous science from the deadly embrace of ideology. At that time (in the 1960's), this was a risky act of revitalization that resonated with the fundamental direction of the Klaus persona. Something from that effort of the one-time isolated brawler persists in a changed image. Vaclav Klaus cannot tolerate anything that smacks of tutelage, that looks like a "raised finger," as he is wont to say, irrespective of whether the reminder is (unjustifiably) ideology or (justifiably) a philosophical or an ethical entitlement or an historic move that is heading in a direction that the chief of the ODS [Civic

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Democratic Party] does not like, or whether the culprit is an uncomfortable partner in a dialogue. All of this is an unpleasant obstacle for him, which must be annulled, disrespected, "overthrown" (and here one can sense the source of that which is customarily known as the "Klaus arrogance").

This urgent need to emancipate his own ego from dominating influences and to control territory yields welcome fruit: If it were not for such a traction machine at its head, the ODS would be writhing about in disarray. Let us just imagine: The Executive Council is just swarming with figures who are not particularly expressive, not particularly mature, who are somewhat headstrong, who are not completely independent, and so forth. Without a conductor, this would be an orchestra that would be quite out of tune. Vaclav Klaus has formed it into an efficient philharmonic orchestra (or possibly a brass band). And he has almost done the same with respect to the government, incidentally. Almost. From time to time, there is a glitch.

The sovereign mastery of his own territory is, however, connected with actions the effects of which are no longer so beneficial. While a person like Vladimir Dlouhy does not start anything with anyone outside of his territory and would rather not speak of it, Vaclav Klaus flings him a glove: He asks him to deal with the guileful and covertly leftist intellectuals, philosophers and moralists with their universalist claims, with the trade unions (which only obstruct), with those tourist-oriented associations, with the regionalists with their self-administration whims, and with other political parties....

The problematic product of Klaus's nature is the inability to tolerate a person of promising format but with a different "paradigm," and an effort to surround himself with people with which there are no problems. Klaus's vanity is detectable, but the Devil take it. Unfortunately, it is also connected with frustration and little tolerance for failure. This is why the Czech prime minister must first make his partner feel insecure or even degrade him before he then debates with him. To be a strong personality without competition is a value that is undoubtedly esthetic, but it can be impractical: The question of a possible Klaus successor could be a serious crisis for the ODS. And one thing more: An individual with a complex of grandiosity frequently causes others to have feelings of inferiority, and that is why he easily makes confirmed enemies for himself. It would be troublesome if these enemies should be members of the Executive Council of the ODS, the leaders of other political parties, the commissioners of the European Union, or important politicians from other countries....

One way or another, the chief of the ODS is the most conspicuous leader on our political scene. The fact that in comparison with the fates of the other postcommunist countries we are coming out optically the best for the time being is, in the final analysis, even to his credit. His followers as well as opponents can therefore be certain that he will occupy an important place in history textbooks. If they survive him, some will glorify him whereas others will make a cuckold of him. It is not beyond the realm of possibility that those who are more prudent will value his Promethean initiative, but they will ask themselves whether he has taken the correct road on the tracks of what are undoubtedly turn-of-the-century times.

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Slovakia: Prime Minister Discusses Coalition, Political Scene

AU2706100396 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 26 Jun 96 pp 1, 6

[Interview with Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar by Viera Urbanova and Jergus Ferko; place and date not given: "Financial Interests of SNS and ZRS Leaders Have Set the Domestic Political Scene in Motion"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA] Mr. Prime Minister, could you analyze the developments in the coalition that have led to the present situation?

[Meciar] The coalition came into being in 1994 for objective reasons, on the basis of the distribution of political forces. A certain mechanism of cooperation was adopted. This mechanism, based on the majority system principle, was not universally accepted. It was assumed that, gradually, as time became ripe for it, some elements of the majority system would be abandoned. The coalition achieved a great deal, be it in the political sphere, in social affairs, or in the economy. At any rate, it stabilized society. However, negative tendencies made themselves felt as well. Support was not achieved within the coalition for a mechanism that would make the development of the political system more flexible. This concerned laws related to territorial and administrative division and the division of powers, the law on political parties, and the electoral law. After these laws were laboriously drafted, the Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS] vetoed them. This was a mistake because, when the floodgates are not opened, the dammed up water will look for other escape routes. Another of the coalition's mistakes was that it was unable to make the privatization system more flexible. Basically, there has been only one meeting since mid-December that decided on privatization projects. Other meetings were either canceled by the chairman of the National Property Fund [FNM] Presidium, or they did not take place [for other reasons]. The tension was mounting and it was necessary to vent it in some way. Communication within the coalition came to a halt. While we were proposing talks to our partners, the ZRS did not sit at the same table with us for two months at all and the Slovak National Party [SNS] only occasionally, but not in its complete lineup. However, these shortcomings were not such that they could trigger a social crisis or that it would be impossible, with a certain amount of good will, to remove them. These shortcomings within the coalition were there, but they did not affect the government, parliament, and the institutions of the state, they only dwelled in the game of political entities. The FNM represented an exception in this respect. It started to become some kind of symbol of the personal prestige and personal interests of some party lobbies. This concerned, first and foremost, issues related to privatization and the FNM where, as a matter of fact, no decisions were being approved. This was compounded, during my sick leave, by subjective factors. Rumors were being spread about my state of health and about the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] splitting into seven factions. Talks with opposition parties were taking place behind our back and agreements of principle were being concluded. These talks were conducted by Stefan Gavornik on behalf of the ZRS and by Jan Slota on behalf of the SNS. The central figure was FNM President Stefan Gavornik. In 1994, Gavornik was in the Democratic Union [DU] election team but, because they ranked him [illegible]ow on their slate, he left them and, after the elect[illegible] joined the ZRS.

The talks were to lead to a power conflict within the state.

[SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA] The decisive moment of the official crack [rozglejenie] in the coalition was the 16th National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR] meeting. On the eve of this meeting, you met with your coalition partners. How did these talks proceed?

[Meciar] I had asked for a meeting of party chairmen and five-member delegations from each party. The meeting was to discuss the agenda and preparations for the NRSR plenum and privatization issues. The ZRS and SNS refused to negotiate on these issues. We spent three hours talking about nothing and then they gave me an ultimatum—either the original management of Slovenska Poistovna [Slovak Insurance Company] was to be reinstated by the next morning, or they would leave the coalition. That was impossible. A political body cannot change the decision of the Supervisory Board, especially when the Supervisory Board is composed so that, out of 11 people, two people are there on behalf of the HZDS and the others on behalf of the SNS and ZRS. Poistovna was a pretext. The promise was made [by the HZDS] that, if [the dismissed managers'] innocence is established after the state agencies complete their inspection, we will publicly apologize and everyone will return to his post. At the Monday [17 June] talks, held prior to the NRSR plenum, they announced that they would not negotiate any more. We told them that, if they submit to the plenum serious matters that have a bearing on the coalition agreements, we, too, are withdrawing from these agreements. The next day, talks were held at the SNS, the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH], and the DU [headquarters]. They agreed on the course of the plenum, where all institutions, with the exception of the government, were to be dismantled.

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They agreed that Stefan Gavornik would remain at the head of the FNM for the ZRS and that our Rehak, the vice president, would be kicked out and replaced by an SNS representative. SDL, DU, and Hungarian Coalition representatives were also to be appointed into the FNM. A situation would arise, in which we would be sitting in the government and the other side would have control over the financial flows of the state. Changes were to take place in the radio, in television, and other institutions.

After this information, we started looking for an ally, for a majority in the NRSR to prevent the government from falling. The new alternative would mean a change in the post of the FNM president and two other Presidium members and a change in the FNM Supervisory Board. A proportional system of representation would come about, but we would stay in these institutions. But the boards of political parties let themselves be heard that they did not give their consent to what had been agreed in Parliament. Even many deputies did not know what was going on.

[SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA] How does the HZDS intend to stabilize the domestic political situation and what are the realistic possibilities for cooperation with other parliamentary parties, especially with the SDL?

[Meciar] The HZDS's cooperation with the ZRS on the basis of a new coalition agreement is still possible. Cooperation is also possible on the basis of agreements between the SNS and HZDS parliamentary clubs. Together, these agreements could guarantee a majority in the NRSR. There is also a realistic possibility of an agreement being concluded between the HZDS and the SDL, in which the SDL would undertake not to express no-confidence in the prime minister until the October 1998 elections. What was to be a source of instability could thus be turned into a source of stability. Provided that we maintain relations in parliament like this, we can have 90 votes, which is a constitutional majority.

[SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA] Will the changes in coalition relations affect the government as well?

[Meciar] Fundamental changes need not occur in the government. A question mark only hangs over the defense department. The other departments are able to work and I would accept their ministers even as cabinet members without party affiliation. None of those who are in the government for the ZRS was a member of this party. What they knew about the activity of their party was what they read in the newspapers. They can leave only on the basis of the passing of a vote of no-confidence in Parliament, by resigning, or on the basis of my decision. I do not intend to make such a decision. The games over the government and parliament do not have a rational core. They can lead to an immediate change in government, but they cannot establish a stable government. The HZDS has 61 votes in Parliament and, if they wanted to push it into opposition, a conglomerate would emerge of 89 votes that are mutually contradictory. The Hungarian parties and the SNS will not last long together. Even if they wanted to, their members would destroy them. An alliance between the Workers [ZRS] and the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] would not last long either. And if the SDL went into a coalition similar to the one in which it was after March 1994, it would mean its end and it would no longer be able to establish itself as a left-wing party. In other words, the contradictions [between the other parties] are such that it is impossible to bypass the HZDS. Even if some wanted to return today to the 1994 project, it would make absolutely no sense. Long-term investment projects have been launched and it would take at least one year [for a new government] to become acquainted with them. We cannot afford to lose that year again. Each instability of the government will make itself felt also in relation to foreign partners.

If the present opposition believes that, if our government fell, the West would start recognizing us, it errs. This political situation can produce a positive solution, even if the situation will no longer be the way it was before. After coalition talks, an agreement was reached that the SNS and the ZRS would assume guarantees for staffing [the management of] Slovenska Poistovna. This is why the HZDS delegated only two people into the Supervisory Board. Gradually, however, warnings started coming in from inside Poistovna regarding unlawful monetary transactions and damage done to this institution. We demanded that Poistovna's Supervisory Board start dealing with this matter. This solution was not feasible because they either did not convene a meeting of the Supervisory Board, or did not listen to us. We demanded, via the FNM, that the FNM Presidium take up the matter. To no avail. Stefan Gavornik always dissolved the meeting. In response to information to which he was alerted by several employees, the finance minister started an inspection. The SNS perceived it as an attack on its positions and started to "purge" people close to the HZDS [from Slovenska Poistovna branches] down to the district level. By now, the inspection has found enough. It has uncovered a great deal, particularly with respect to transactions on the capital account—several hundred million [korunas]. [SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA] Will you publish these findings?

[Meciar] Yes. The minister of finance was assigned the task of publishing the results of the investigation, in

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which the Financial Police will take part. The Poistovna affair will still unfold and the Finance Ministry has the task to publish what it can. We have signals that a similar situation also exists in Investicna a Rozvojova Banka [Investment and Development Bank]. As far as we are concerned, the Poistovna affair never had a hidden political meaning that would be directed against another political party.

[SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA] To what extent are you ready to accept the SDL's demands, which include, among other things, the replacement of the FNM [management] and of the Slovak Television [STV] Council?

[Meciar] We agreed that the SDL would on no account support a vote of no-confidence in the government. We also agreed that only the reconstruction of FNM bodies be discussed at the 16th NRSR meeting, and not the reconstruction of other bodies. We will supply the agreements in the FNM. [sentence as published] We propose proportional representation so that there will be three Common Choice representatives in the FNM Presidium, three for the HZDS, two neutral representatives, and one from the ZRS. The distribution of seats in the FNM Supervisory Board will be somewhat different. It will be joined by three new people, who would be from other parties. As for the other SDL demands, it is premature to talk about them. The negotiations are under way. The SDL does not want to go into the government. The situation that has emerged set all political entities in motion. In the Common Choice, this manifested in the tendency to set up two separate parliamentary clubs—an SDL club and one for the rest of the Common Choice. Within the SDL, there are different views on cooperation with us. Vestiges of tough rejection of cooperation with us from the Weiss era linger on. The SDL thinks that the most advantageous position for them would be participation in some control institutions. That is, not being in the government and not sharing responsibility for executive power. The dismissal of the STV Council is not on the agenda. What could happen, at the most, is the putting forward of demands for the inclusion of some people who would be proposed by another political entity. The present members of the STV Council are not political representatives, in my opinion. They are experts, cultural and national representatives. It is necessary to solve conditions under which an open agreement would be concluded between the HZDS and the SDL, in which they would undertake not to express no-confidence in the government and, something we demand, to establish a mechanism of cooperation that would ensure the passage of laws in Parliament so that Parliament is not blocked. We do not want to anticipate the result of this process, but we want to agree on the course of action. Of course, if we maintained or renewed coalition with the Workers [ZRS] and a part of the SNS, a functional majority would emerge in Parliament, even without the SDL.

[SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA] Are you not afraid that trading in deputies' votes will begin?

[Meciar] The lesson from the year 1994 remains an unpleasant factor. The poaching of deputies to the other side during voting is possible, but I do not think that money could play such a significant role today as it did then. Our duty is to protect our deputies and cooperate with them and to negotiate also with other deputies and their parties. If we did not succeed in this, the only way out would be early elections sometime in the spring of next year. They need not be, but I do not rule them out.

It is precisely the Workers and the SNS who fear early elections the most because, most probably, they would not even get into Parliament. People are asking: Why has the coalition fallen apart? Our failure on some aspects of some projects was paradoxical. For example, the SNS initiated the Penal Code amendment but the SNS and the ZRS then brought the issue to a halt five times. That was the first paradox. The second paradox was that they did not want to support the law on administrative and territorial division. They understood their denial of support for this law as pressure on me because, if this change, which affects the whole of Slovakia, did not occur now, it would be my fiasco. For personal reasons, they were ready to halt a process that was well on its way, comprehensively prepared, and discussed in hundreds of towns and communities.

In conclusion, I would like to stress that the HZDS does not want to enter into an open confrontation with the SNS and the ZRS. Quite the contrary, there is a common interest here—but it is the national program, or the social program—which should be carried on. We do not want to take steps in public that would pit us one against the other. I repeat that cooperation with Jan Slota is not possible and that Stefan Gavornik is absolutely unacceptable to us.

Everyone must bear responsibility for his policy. We cannot betray the government's program. We did not go into the government in order to privatize.

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Slovakia: NATO Membership, Coalition Crisis Discussed

AU2706130196 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 26 Jun 96 p 9

[Commentary by Ivan Horsky: "The Foreign Policy Parameters of Another Meciar Transformation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The conflict within the present government coalition in Slovakia, orchestrated by Vladimir Meciar, undoubtedly has, apart from serious domestic political parameters, also broader international aspects. These may even play a more important role in the final decisionmaking of the prime minister and Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] chairman than domestic policy considerations. After all, much more important issues are at stake than just snatching a slice of the privatization pie.

Slovakia has become a pariah among the countries of the Visegrad Four and is no longer being reckoned with publicly as a candidate for admission into NATO in the first round, in one package with the other three members of this group. It is symptomatic that Vladimir Meciar has hardened his stand against his coalition partners at a time when, after a longer "post-demarche" time out, it was quite officially declared at a meeting of the NATO Council, in the United States and in other countries of the alliance, that Bratislava is dropping out of the first expansion round.

This must have been a very serious political shock for him, especially in view of his perception of Slovakia's foreign policy position. The very idea that our three neighbors could get into this pact, which is at the same a guarantor of political stability and economic prosperity, certainly did nothing to improve his physical and mental condition.

The idea of an isolated Slovakia in the heart of Europe, moreover with coalition partners preferring the increasingly dubious, naive idea of neutrality in this sensitive geopolitical space, was bound to be disagreeable to him, even though for a long time he was trying to convince himself and his supporters that the alliance's expansion without Slovakia was not possible, precisely for geopolitical reasons.

Here, too, it was confirmed that Vladimir Meciar is not a full-blooded politician in the full sense of the word. He lets himself be carried away too long by his frequently fixed ideas or by the ideas of some of his aides and advisers. He does not fully realize that it was his policy that jeopardized and perhaps still jeopardizes the fundamental interests of the state, whose "father" he declares himself to be. The security of a state is determined not only by political and military factors, but also by economic ones. If someone believes that the prime minister, as the representative of Slovakia, can afford repeatedly not to fulfill his own promises made countless times to his partners at the negotiating table and occasionally even lie and cheat like a village grocer, he cannot be surprised when they react appropriately. At the same time, what they are doing is no diktat, as he himself and his palatines occasionally try to contend.

Slovakia must unequivocally declare its choice not by words, but by deeds. It is a paradox of Slovak politics that, according to foreign diplomats and security experts, cooperation in the military sphere is at a much higher level than cooperation in the political, legislative, and economic spheres. Unfortunately, however, this is too little for Slovakia to become in their eyes sufficiently credible and to deserve to be invited among the Atlantic 16. Vladimir Meciar now has the last chance to repair what he himself has spoiled.

Slovakia: Meciar on Stable Government, Improving 'Reputation'

LD2606125796 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 0500 GMT 26 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] A special government aircraft is ready to take off from Milan Rastislav Stefanik Airport in Bratislava and travel to Strasbourg where the summer session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe opened on Monday [24 June]. Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar will address the assembly at noon today. Prior to his one-day trip to Strasbourg, Meciar gave an interview to editor Jarmila Tosecka, who is in his press entourage.

[Begin recording] [Tosecka] Prime Minister, you are leaving for Strasbourg at a time when the situation here in Slovakia is rather complex, or tense, I would say. Will this fact be reflected in your address to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe?

[Meciar] Despite this situation, let us try to identify the positive factors that are emerging. The positions of all political entities are being reviewed once again and ways out of this situation are being evaluated. Some positive conclusions produced by these reviews are already clear.

The first thing is that the destructive internal political struggle and the bringing of domestic problems to an international level is damaging for the Slovak Republic as a whole.

The second thing is that to improve the reputation of the state also in connection with the integration into European structures, Slovakia needs a stable government. These are the positive conclusions and everyone, not

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just a handful of people whose reasoning is a little different, is aware of them. This means that a new factor is emerging—a type of cooperation between the opposition and government coalition, which has been lacking so far.

This will enable me to present Slovakia in Strasbourg, not in a negative, but, on the contrary, in a positive light. I will be able to do this because I am aware that the new cooperation that is emerging could became more permanent precisely as a result of the current situation and the current political negotiations.

[Tosecka] What, in general, would you like to highlight in your Strasbourg speech?

[Meciar] Speaking in Strasbourg, in the Council of Europe, is undoubtedly an honor. I received the invitation a long time ago and now I am able to implement it and present the Slovak Republic as a modern, democratic and (?dynamic) state. I will be able to present our experience gained from transformation and the ways in which transformation was implemented in Slovakia. Our efforts have already won international recognition. We will be able to take up and set out our position on the main international political, economic, and legal issues, including human and civil rights in Europe.

Nowadays, the Council of Europe is an institution that is becoming a conscience of Europe and giving an account in front of this European conscience is important both for me personally and for our republic.

My speech will be followed by an open discussion with deputies. This does not worry me at all. On the contrary, I look forward to a mutual exchange of views. I think it will be friendly and I do not at all expect that questions given to me could be motivated by malice. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Slovakia: SDL Says Adjournment of Parliament Averted Crisis

AU2606145296 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 26 Jun 96 pp 1-2

[Report by Martin Krno: "Reversal Was Supposedly Imminent"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The proposal to adjourn the 16th meeting of the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR] until 1 July was supported on Tuesday by 85 of the 133 deputies present. It was endorsed by deputies for the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS]/Slovak Farmers Party, the Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS], the Slovak National Party [SNS], and the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL]. A total of 46 deputies—members of the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH], Democratic Union [DU], Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement [MKDH], and Hungarian Coalition parliamentary clubs, representatives of the Social Democratic Party of Slovakia, Anton Juris from the Green Party in Slovakia [SZS], Jozef Klein from the Farmers Movement of the Slovak Republic, and Milan Ftacnik from the SDL—voted against adjournment. Jozef Pokorny (SZS) and Peter Weiss (SDL) abstained from voting. [passage omitted]

In an interview for PRAVDA, Robert Fico, chief of the Common Choice Club of Deputies, said that "one need not look for any ulterior motives behind the proposal to adjourn the meeting of Parliament. The parties need time to prepare further negotiations. Support for the government coalition, that is, how many ZRS and SNS deputies have returned to the coalition's womb after their Friday [21 June] rebellion, is still not clear. In other words, the question of the balance of power in the NRSR must be solved first. We will insist on the election of a seventh OKO [Special Supervisory Body monitoring the secret services] representative from the ranks of the opposition. But if someone is pushing into OKO at any price a person who has no chance of being accepted, he is acting capriciously." As Fico said, the HZDS has expressed its readiness to assess even changes in the composition of the National Property Fund and in the television and radio councils. "We are not rushing into the government or anywhere else," he stressed. "Our endeavor was to avert a political crisis, which we have accomplished. Last Friday there was a realistic threat of a repeat of the parliamentary night of 3-4 November 1994 [when the present coalition assumed control of all parliamentary bodies, the secret service, the National Property Fund, and the state-controlled media], only in reverse. The SDL rejects such a policy. We respect the election results. It is impossible at present to govern in this state without the HZDS. We wish the prime minister that he may govern well until the end of this electoral term." We learned from Robert Fico that the SDL Executive Committee would meet on Friday [28 June] and the SDL Republican Board on Saturday.

Slovakia: HZDS Seen as Pushing Defense Minister To Resign

AU2606124896

[FBIS Report] Slovak newspapers on 22 and 24 June report on Slovak National Party [SNS] Chairman Jan Slota's and Defense Minister Jan Sitek's reaction to the Defense Ministry civilian employees' letter of 20 June that demanded Sitek's resignation because of "incompetent management" and the "squandering" of "entrusted financial resources."

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Bratislava NOVY CAS in Slovak on 22 June on page 2 carries a 250-word interview with SNS Chairman Jan Slota by "ay" entitled "Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] Launched Attack on Minister Sitek." The interview, the place and date of which are not given, includes the following passage:

"[NOVY CAS] The Defense Ministry employees' expression of no-confidence in Jan Sitek is regarded by many as a HZDS operation against your minister. What information do you have about this matter?

"[Slota] We have similar information concerning this expression of no-confidence. Our information confirms that activity on the part of the HZDS is involved."

Bratislava SME in Slovak on 22 June on page 3 carries a 400-word report by Juraj Mravec entitled "SME Editor in Defense Minister Sitek's Bedroom." The report gives an account of the author's visit to Defense Minister Sitek's Bratislava apartment, the alleged expensive furnishing of which the Defense Ministry employees' "open letter" cited as an example of the minister's wasteful use of money. Besides describing the furnishing of Sitek's apartment, which is reportedly very modest, the SME editor quotes the defense minister's comments on his employees' open letter: "I do not remember any instance of relations between me and State Secretary Gajdos, who was nominated to this post on behalf of the HZDS, coming to a head of late. At the same time, the open letter was obviously initiated by people from the state secretary's surroundings. What is happening is sick. The Army is the public institution enjoying the public's greatest trust, five inspections from the Supreme Inspection Office uncovered no breach in financial discipline, and now this happens." Sitek also rejects the Defense Ministry employees' criticism of the purchase of two BMW limousines for the Defense Ministry, saying that it was the Slovak Government that had decided that each ministry should have two BMW's.

Bratislava PRACA in Slovak on 24 June on page 2 carries a 300-word report by "rtl" on the 22 June meeting of the SNS Central Council in Zilina. Replying after the meeting to a PRACA question regarding the "challenging of Defense Minister Jan Sitek," SNS Chairman Jan Slota reportedly said: "In the resolution we expressed support for the work of SNS ministers. A female employee in the rank of secretary comes up with ridiculous accusations and the media take it seriously. This is absurd and ridiculous. This is why we did not react to it. It corresponds to the level of the person who initiated it. It was a colleague from my parliamentary committee—he even chairs the committee [reference to HZDS MP Imrich Andrejcak, chairman of the parliamentary Defense and Security Affairs Committee and former defense minister]. It corresponds to his intelligence level. I can only feel sorry for him when he deals with issues such as what cars were bought. He should take an interest in how the Army is being restructured, in matters that cause soldiers' and officers' dissatisfaction. The person of the defense minister should not be politicized. This is very dangerous. The Army is above party affairs, and politics has no business being there."

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Hungary: Five Opposition Parties Unite To 'Protect Democracy'

LD2606135296 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1000 GMT 26 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Five parliamentary opposition parties have called on the government coalition parties in a letter to submit their proposal on how they plan to settle the dispute over the house rules. As is known, this situation evolved as a result of a government coalition proposal to limit preagenda contributions. Attila Kert reports on a press briefing held jointly by the opposition parliamentary group leaders:

[Kert] Tamas Isepy, parliamentary group leader of the Christian Democratic People's Party [KDNP], said that what the opposition is guarding is not the institution of the preagenda contributions against the government parties, but democracy against a unilateral amendment to the house rules.

Jozsef Torgyan, chairman of the Independent Smallholders' Party [FKGP], considers the restriction on preagenda contributions to be a restriction on democracy. He thinks the postponement of voting on the house rules proves that the government recognizes it has stepped on dangerous ground. The opposition is now waiting for the coalition's proposal on settling the dispute.

Jozsef Szajer, parliamentary group leader of the Federation of Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic Party [Fidesz-MPP], said that he does not hope for a compromise or, at least, he considers the postponement of the voting simply a delaying tactic. He thinks the government has simply taken fright over its own failures, and therefore tried to limit the opposition's opportunity to speak. The opposition has hardly any opportunity to speak to the public anyway, because the mainly progovernment press gives hardly any scope for the opposition, he said.

Ivan Szabo of the Hungarian Democratic People's Party [MDNP] rejected the [government parties'] claim that there is not enough time left for legislation because of the preagenda contributions. He recalled that the government has so far failed to submit 33 bills on schedule.

The Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] viewes developments over the forthcoming week as a test, Ervin Demeter [MDF parliamentary group leader] said. He thinks it will show whether the government coalition's measure to unilaterally amend the Constitution's stipulations on local government in 1994 was a simple mistake, or whether the government's ignorance of the unwritten political law [on cross-party consensus over bills requiring qualified majority to be passed] will become common practice.

The opposition politicians were united in saying that this is the first time that the five opposition parliamentary group leaders have acted jointly in public to protect democracy.

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B-H: PM Muratovic on Importance of Elections

AU2706110196 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 27 Jun 96 p 5

[Interview with Bosnia-Herzegovina Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic by Stephan Israel in Sarajevo; date not given: "New People Will Come to Power"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Israel] Mr. Muratovic, the preconditions for democratic elections in Bosnia have not been fulfilled. Nevertheless, your government has agreed to the 14 September date.

[Muratovic] I believe that, if war criminals like Karadzic and Mladic, against whom arrest warrants have been issued, will soon be brought to the tribunal in The Hague, a minimum of preconditions for democratic elections might still be achieved by September. It is very difficult to say what might be worse: postponing the elections or holding them. During the first two or three elections, we will not have really democratic conditions. But the further we go, the stronger democracy will become. And we expect a real reintegration of the state. New people will come to power and responsibility will be shared, whereas unitary parties still exist in many places today.

[Israel] The elections might consolidate Bosnia's division.

[Muratovic] This is not true, because the elections will in fact create legitimate institutions for a state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This why we need elections so urgently. We cannot build our state without elections. Thus, we say that we are satisfied with a minimum of democratic conditions for the elections. Our parliaments are not completely legal because we have replaced many deputies who were killed or expelled during the war. And the Serbs will participate in the common institutions after the elections. As long as we have no elections, we will also have to live with the illegal institutions of the Croats in Herzegovina.

[Israel] The conditions might have deteriorated by September.

[Muratovic] If the preconditions are not fulfilled by September, there can be no real election campaign. This is what we are most worried about. Then the people who came to power during the war will in all likelihood be able to legitimize their positions. The leadership in Pale will do everything to make the situation more complicated. The people around Karadzic would prefer a Cyprus-like situation; they would like to retain the status quo and change nothing. They want to remain as isolated as possible, so that they can govern their territory without granting access to the international community. If a minimum of preconditions are fulfilled, however, we expect changes, we expect new people to come to power, not only in the "Republika Srpska" but in many other areas of the Federation, too.

[Israel] It is true that Serb leader Karadzic is a nuisance. Yet the problems within the Muslim-Croatian federation [Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina] might be far more dangerous for Bosnia.

[Muratovic] There is some truth in that, but you cannot compare the situation in the Federation to that of the Serb-controlled territories. There are Croatian regions in the Federation that share the philosophy of the "Republika Srpska." In Kiseljak, for example, 20 km from here, some kind of apartheid philosophy prevails where non-Croats are not granted access. They do not accept the laws, the police, or the courts of the Bosnian state. They are living as if they were in an island. But these are not political problems; they are problems of the mafia and of war profiteers. The leaders have influenced their people via the media, they sold this mafia deal as a political issue to them, and they told them that they had to protect Croats. Their objective is not an independent state, but just to continue to collect taxes and to control the black market.

[Israel] In retrospect, has the international community done enough to create preconditions for democratic elections?

[Muratovic] It has not done enough. First, it should have eliminated the indicted war criminals. We, as well as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, are Karadzic's and Mladic's hostages. But I am not only talking about Karadzic and Mladic. It is true that they are important, because they control the police and military regime of the "Republika Srpska." This pariah state would certainly have been weakened by the departure of those two from the political scene. That would also have improved the situation of the opposition. Yet I was referring to all the indicted war criminals—within the Federation, too.

B-H: Buses to Mostar Viewed as Unlikely From RS, Belgrade

AU2606152296 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 26 Jun 96

[Report by Halil Sefka—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] Another news conference was held in Mostar today on the eve of the Sunday elections in this city. Halil Sefka reports.

[Sefka] The news conference at the seat of the EU administration was opened by the spokesman of the EU administration, Dragan Gasic, who pointed out that

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only foreign journalists were invited, while domestic colleagues will be subsequently informed of details on all issues relating to the Mostar elections at a regular news conference on Friday [28 Jun]. Thereafter, Gasic handed the microphone to the commander of the Southeast Division of the Implementation Force [IFOR], General Lambert, who, speaking about the role of his soldiers on election day, pointed out:

[Lambert in English with superimposed Serbo-Croatian translation] The multinational Southeast Division, of which I am the commander, has already made a tour of the city, together with representatives of the EU administration, local police forces, the international police force, and representatives of parties. Our mission is very clear to us, and the role of the local police forces is to ensure unobstructed voting for voters regardless of whether they are in Mostar or are arriving from third countries. The EU international police will extend support to the local police forces as much as possible. According to information we have, some 450 policemen will be deployed, which reduces to a ratio of one policeman to 2,000 citizens. The multinational Southeast Division will extend support to the international police and the EU administration, if administrator Casado asks for it. The plan of military support will follow three principles, of which the first one is to ensure general security in the Mostar region, which will ensure the freedom of movement for everybody. The second principle is the capacity of undertaking rapid and powerful actions, and finally the third principle is to give the elections an international character, which will be IFOR's role.

[Sefks] The commander of IFOR's Southeast Division went on to point out that they have increased the number of liaison officers and strengthened their communication network. On election day, Gen. Lambert continued, IFOR forces will be discreetly present on Mostar streets, because they do not want to turn a city into a fortress. Asked whether IFOR will be securing polling stations, Gen. Lambert gave a diplomatic answer, saying that their role is to protect all the citizens of Mostar. An almost identical answer was given to the question whether it is true that IFOR members are protecting the bearer of the election list of the five opposition parties. To the question of how many buses will arrive in Mostar from third countries on election day, the answer was provided by EU spokesman Gasic, who pointed out that so far 14 buses have been announced, with no buses coming from Belgrade or from the Serb entity. In addition to this, Gasic continued, Serb representatives in Mostar are not expecting any arrival of Mostar citizens who are currently living in the Serb entity. Asked whether it is so due to the fact that security cannot be guaranteed to them, Gasic answered that Mostar could be reached also via Montenegro or Croatia, and in that case they do not have to travel through the Serb Republic [RS]. Journalists showed greatest interest in the fact that representatives of the five opposition parties in west Mostar are exposed to various pressures, and according to some information, some of them have even been physically maltreated. To the direct question whether opposition candidates have been attacked, administrator Casado answered that he had received information from some journalists about physical maltreatment of some candidates, but the local police said that was not true. Answering the question why four candidates of Croatian nationality on the opposition election list have withdrawn their candidacies, representatives of the EU administration pointed out that it is a personal matter of those candidates.

B-H: Muratovic, Rehn Discuss Conditions for Mostar Elections

AU2606185996 Paris AFP in English 1849 GMT 26 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina, June 26 (AFP)—The crucial upcoming municipal elections in the divided southern town of Mostar will be neither perfect nor an outright failure, senior EU officials said Wednesday.

Speaking to journalists four days before Bosnia's first post-war vote is due to take place, the EU chief in the town, Ricardo Perez Casado, stressed that Sunday's polls would not be exemplary.

"These elections will not be perfect but they are the first step towards the normalisation of political and social life in this city," Perez Casado, the EU administrator in Mostar, told a press conference.

Dragan Gasic, the EU spokesman in Mostar, said that everyone was watching Mostar's polls to see what mistakes were made, ahead of countrywide elections due to take place throughout Bosnia on September 14.

"They will not be a failure," he said of the Mostar polls.

Mostar, divided between Moslems and Croats, has been under EU administration for two years and the European Union is supervising Sunday's municipal elections, the first post-war polls in Bosnia.

Croatia has asked that the list of people crossing its territory to vote in Mostar be communicated three days in advance, Bosnian Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic said Wednesday in Sarajevo.

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Moslem Mostar Mayor Safet Orucevic and Perez Casado met in Mostar to discuss the issue, Muratovic said.

Muratovic said the Croatian request was "impossible" to meet and that because of this people will probably be taken to western countries, such as Germany, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland, to vote.

Muratovic said there were cases in Mostar of mistreatment of certain people by extremists. "There were some maltreatments of persons just to show by extremists that they will try to damage the environment for the elections," Muratovic said.

One opposition candidate was assaulted Sunday by people who broke into his office and several other opposition candidates said they had been threatened.

UN rapporteur for human rights Elisabeth Rehn, who met Wednesday with Muratovic, said she hopes "some changes could be made before September 14 in a positive direction" to make the elections work.

The elections in Mostar were first due to take place on May 31 but were put back until June 30 when Moslem and independent parties demanded that refugees from the city be allowed to vote.

Roughly half of Mostar's former population of 120,000 comprises refugees, according to EU estimates, and thousands of refugees who left Mostar will be allowed to vote in polling stations set up in countries to which they have travelled.

But it remains unclear how many refugees will return to their former hometown to cast their vote. Gasic said that the EU, which is paying for buses to bring back refugees, had been asked to pay for 14 so far, although they expected many more.

He said that they had not been asked to pay for any from Serbia, Montenegro or the Republika Srpska [Serb Republic]—the Serb entity in Bosnia.

Before the war, Mostar had a population of 120,000 inhabitants of whom 34 percent were Moslem, 33 percent Croat, 19 percent Serb and the remainder from other communities, according to the 1991 census.

Asked about reports that opposition candidates had been attacked or threatened, Gasic said that no such incidents had been reported to the police and that nothing could be done unless the police were officially informed.

The reports concerned the Unified Democrats list which said Tuesday one of its candidates had been attacked at the weekend and four, including leader Jole Musa, had received threats.

In a statement published in the Sarajevo paper Oslobodjenje Wednesday, the Unified Democrats said the elections would turn into a "farce and caricature of democracy" unless such incidents stopped.

It said their candidates had been subjected to "unprecedented pressure, physical aggression, blackmail, intimidation and death threats against their children and families with the sole aim of making them live in an atmosphere of fear."

The party includes representatives of Croats, Moslems and Serbs.

B-H: Government Lifts Movement Restrictions 26 Jun-4 Jul

LD2606210796 Sarajevo BH PRESS in Serbo-Croatian 1748 GMT 26 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 26 Jun (BH PRESS)—In view of the fact that Sarajevo is hosting the Reconstruction '96 international fair, that Ajvatovci Days '96 cultural and religious events are taking place in central Bosnia, and that election preparations are being completed in Mostar, the minister of internal affairs of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation has lifted the order restricting movement throughout the Federation during the period from 26 June to 4 July, the Ministry of Internal Affairs said in a statement today.

B-H: Ambassador Denies Agreement To Block Refugee Return

AU2606171496 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 26 Jun 96

[Report by Nada al-Issa—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bosnia-Herzegovina refugees from the Serb entity who want to return to Bosnia-Herzegovina through Croatia have problems traveling through Croatia because they cannot obtain transit visas. In Croatia, it has been reported that a deal has been struck on that between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Bosnia-Herzegovina ambassador to Croatia, Kasim Trnka, has denied this vehemently. BH PRESS correspondent Nada al-Issa talked with Mr. Trnka.

[Al-Issa] [Words indistinct] Bosnia-Herzegovina refugees, and I have to say predominantly from the Serb entity, who want to return to Bosnia via Croatia complain that the Croatian office for refugees is telling them that there is, reportedly, an agreement, even in written form, between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina that they should not be let through Croatia to return to Bosnia. What is the truth about this?

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[Trnka] Of course, we reject any such idea, primarily because it is quite illogical. Bosnia-Herzegovina has a huge interest in enabling all its citizens to return to their homes on any part of Bosnia-Herzegovina's territory, and in the simplest possible way. Even if, in the first instance, it is not possible to return to the Serb entity, we still consider that it is possible to leave the territory of the state they are currently residing in to come to Bosnia-Herzegovina. On the other hand, one ought to be aware that we have now introduced a different regime for the citizens on the territory of the Federation, and also that, in the meantime, an agreement has been signed between the Governments of Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Slovenia, and Croatia on the unobstructed return of war refugees from the entire territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina through the territory of the Republic of Croatia. According to a provision of that agreement, this means that, first, refugees have the right to visit their former places of residence in order to examine the possibilities of their return. Second, they are able to come to Bosnia-Herzegovina to take part in the elections, particularly on the Mostar elections on 30 June, and third, when they decide to return to Bosnia-Herzegovina, they can also travel through Croatia without hindrance.

[Al-Issa] Have you contacted any representative of the Croatian authorities yet to clarify this problem?

[Trnka] Precisely yesterday, I had a meeting with Foreign Minister Granic and his aides. In compliance with the agreement reached at the highest level of the Council for Cooperation, chaired by Presidents Tudjman and Izetbegovic, we agreed that transit trips through Croatia should be facilitated to the greatest possible extent, and the draft of a new protocol has been prepared that, in addition to the categories I have already mentioned, also anticipates the possibility of return without visas for Bosnia-Herzegovina citizens, including those from the Serb entity, who already have residence or work permits in third countries. In other words, those citizens can always return to those third countries. Minister Granic expressed support for that proposal, and we hope that it will immediately be put through procedures in both governments. We also expect a meeting between delegations of the two governments to take place in early July, at which the new protocol will be signed, thereby making it possible for a substantial category of the Bosnia-Herzegovina citizens to travel without visas. That is, if we consider that [word indistinct] from the territory of the Federation are also included in this nonvisa regime, this category that I have just mentioned, and all the refugees, then we can indeed speak about considerable progress. I have to point out that, with regard to several warnings from our citizens and media, that, allegedly, Bosnia-Herzegovina itself is asking Croatia to obstruct the refugees' return, I have asked Minister Granic whether they have issued any such instructions to their border and customs officials and police. He resolutely denied any such allegation. He said that, of course, Croatia had never issued any such order, for Bosnia-Herzegovina does not have any interest in that.

[Al-Issa] This is what the agreements, treaties, and various official papers say. However, the situation in the field is quite different. According to information we obtained from the Bosnia-Herzegovina Embassy in Ljubljana, Slovenia, around 300 Bosnia-Herzegovina refugees from the so-called Serb entity are queueing up in front of our office there on a daily basis. They have been waiting for days for a transit permit through Croatia, on their way to Bosnia, but, so far, none have been obtained.

B-H: BBC Airs Interview With Serb Foreign Minister 24 Jun

LD2606153896 London BBC World Service in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 24 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer] Our correspondent Lidija Vukicevic has interviewed Aleksa Buha, foreign minister of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic. He resolutely denies reports suggesting President Karadzic will step down.

[Begin recording] [Buha] We will hold the SDS [Serb Democratic Party] convention on 28 June and the new party leadership will be elected at the conference. After this, in about five to six days, the new leadership, i.e., the main committee, will make a list of parliamentary candidates for our assembly and also a list of our candidates, 14 of them, for the joint [Serb, Croat and Muslim] assembly. They will also nominate candidates for president and vice president of the republic and our representative in the joint presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina. We still have no definite standpoints regarding the personnel solutions.

[Vukicevic] Is the decision by the municipal SDS committee to nominate Mr. Karadzic an indication of the climate [in the Serb Republic]?

[Buha] That is certain. Similar initiatives are coming from other areas and it is a reliable indication of the mood of our people regarding President Karadzic's nomination.

[Vukicevic] The international community did not like this at all. Carl Bild's spokesman said today that this nomination would be crazy and that it would cause

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serious consequences. Do you take note of international reactions?

[Buha] Above all, we have to heed the mood of our people. Naturally, we cannot behave like we are living on an isolated island. We will also have to take note of the international community's standpoints. It is difficult to predict the final outcome.

[Vukicevic] What is the current climate in relations and contacts with representatives of the international community?

[Buha] During the Florence meeting, they already said that selective sanctions were possible as a last resort. The sanctions would be selective in the economic area and, as far as I remember, Yugoslav sportsmen would be banned from taking part in international competitions. I hope that the international community will exercise common sense. The introduction of sanctions would threaten the whole Dayton agreement because the mood in the Serb Republic could become very negative. I would not even rule out chaos, God forbid. In any case the agreement would be seriously threatened.

[Vukicevic] Is the nomination of Mr. Karadzic contrary to the provisions of the Dayton agreement?

[Buha] The agreement is being interpreted in such a way that its provisions and its spirit are being linked with the Hague tribunal. The international community of course insists on the Hague tribunal which has shown its real face to a large extent so far. What Mr. Cassese said in Florence should never be said by someone who is dealing with justice in the name of the international community. He even said that it would have been better not to set up the Hague tribunal if our [Serb] leaders were not handed over to it. Thus, he confirmed that the Hague tribunal was a pure political construction and that it had been set up to try only Serbs, i.e., the leaders of the Serb Republic.

[Vukicevic] However, you signed the Dayton agreement under which you are suppose to cooperate with the very same tribunal.

[Buha] Yes, we agreed to cooperate. However, cooperation is one thing and extradition is another. Cooperation is one thing and condemnation of people before a verdict is returned is another. [end recording]

B-H: Karadzic To Resign in Return for Serb Entity's Recognition

AU2606135196 Paris AFP in English 1311 GMT 26 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Pale, Bosnia-Herzegovina, June 26 (AFP)—Bosnian Serb "president" Radovan Karadzic would agree to step down if he won "very firm guarantees" of recognition for the Bosnian Serb entity, a source close to the Bosnian Serb authorities told AFP Wednesday [26 June].

The source said Karadzic had agreed to step down if he got the guarantees that the Serbs' "vital interests" would be protected.

These "vital interests" were understood by observers here to be international recognition of the Serb entity in Bosnia as a state.

"We are just asking that the Dayton agreement be fully applied, nothing more, nothing less," said the source, who asked not to be named.

The report followed a report in an independent Belgrade publication, VIP, which said Wednesday Karadzic had set terms for his resignation.

The terms were that the international community guarantee "the respect of a minimum status as a state" to the Serb entity which should "enjoy full sovereignty within Bosnia-Herzegovina," he said.

The international community has demanded Karadzic—an indicted war crimes suspect—step down as "president" of the Bosnian Serbs. A top Serb official said Tuesday Karadzic would step down if it was in Serb interests.

Serb deputies meeting in Pale late Tuesday debated Karadzic's future role, the Serb news agency SRNA reported.

B-H: Serb Leadership 'Did Not Offer Guarantees' on Karadzic

LD2606140196 London BBC World Service in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 26 Jun 96

[Report by Belgrade correspondent Djordje Vlajic]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] A statement released by the office of [FRY President] Zoran Lilic on yesterday's talks between [Serbian President] Slobodan Milosevic, Lilic, and [Montenegrin President] Momir Bulatovic with Bosnian Serb representatives held in the office of the Serbian president attracted much attention among the local public [in Belgrade]. [passage omitted]

The publication of this statement has been interpreted here as additional pressure on Karadzic to leave the political arena officially. It coincides with Carl Bildt's visit to Belgrade last night and his visit to Pale today.

It appears that [Serb Republic Vice President] Biljana Plavsic and [Serb Republic Vice President] Nikola Koljevic did not offer guarantees yesterday that Karadzic

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would resign after the electoral convention of the Serb Democratic Party, which is scheduled to take place on Friday. Therefore, official Belgrade has openly threatened the Pale leadership. It is believed here that the aforementioned statement is a sign of a significant exacerbation in relations between the government in Belgrade and Pale, but also a sign to the international community that Belgrade is doing everything within its power. [passage omitted]

B-H: Paper Claims Karadzic Changed Mind on Candidacy

AU2706101296 Belgrade NEDELJNI TELEGRAF in Serbo-Croatian 26 Jun 96 p 14

[Report by B.L.: "Karadzic Listens to Plavsic—Will Run Out of Spite"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The candidacy of Dr. Radovan Karadzic for the Serb Republic president will be announced at the St. Vitus gathering of the ruling Serbian Democratic Party [SDS] in Pale on 28 June, NEDELJNI TELEGRAF has learned from well-informed circles close to this party.

Our sources claim that Karadzic, despite the pressure by the international community and also Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, as well as written guarantees that he would not run, decided to the contrary. Two weeks ago Jovica Stanisic, chief of the Serbian security service, after a whole night spent with Karadzic in his home in Pale extracted a signature from him with which the Serb Republic president was stepping down from the candidacy at the forthcoming elections.

After this, our sources report, a commotion occurred in the SDS leadership. "The people of continuity," that is, those who have been at the top since the SDS formation—Momcilo Krajisnik and Aleksa Buha—with the help of a segment of this party's membership, tried to take advantage of Karadzic's signature and his stepping down by drawing their own candidacies—Buha for the Serb Republic president and Krajisnik for the Bosnia-Herzegovina Union presidency member.

However, at a hint from Dr. Biljana Plavsic, the sources of NEDELJNI TELEGRAF report, the municipal SDS committee in Pale, revolted by Krajisnik's and Buha's move, unexpectedly started an initiative for Karadzic nevertheless to run for Serb Republic president. The municipal SDS committee in Banja Luka supported the initiative and a fierce campaign started in all other municipal SDS committees recently to collect the signatures in support of Karadzic's candidacy. Dr. Biljana Plavsic, as our reliable sources claim, insisted that the participants of the St. Vitus' day celebration support Karadzic.

It goes without saying that the Interim Electoral Commission will not allow Dr. Radovan Karadzic to run at the coming elections; however, it is more or less definite, the sources of NEDELJNI TELEGRAF assure, that Dr. Karadzic and his sympathizers will not relinquish the candidacy. The same sources, however, leave open the possibility of Dr. Karadzic stepping down at the last moment under pressure from Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. [passage omitted]

The SDS has not decided yet who will be the main candidates on their electoral lists. It is quite certain, our sources in Pale emphasize, that Dr. Karadzic will nominate somebody from the party "hard core" for the presidency member of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Union.

This definitely will not be Biljana Plavsic. As a possible candidate, these same sources mention Vojislav Maksimovic, former SDS deputy in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly and the Mayor of the Serb Sarajevo. [passage omitted]

B-H: SDS Secretary Comments on Karadzic Position

LD2606194996 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1645 GMT 26 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sarajevo, 26 Jun (SRNA)—Vlado Vrkes, secretary of the presidium of the Serb Democratic Party [SDS], today welcomed the decision by OSCE Chairman Flavio Cotti to hold elections in the Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croat federation on 14 September. He said the SDS is fully ready and expects certain victory.

"We have completed our internal party elections, we have brought in new blood; it remains for us to elect a new main committee at the party assembly on 28 June, to adopt a program and a new statute, to establish party lists, and to move on to victory," Vrkes said in an interview to SRNA.

Vrkes said that the St. Vitus's Day assembly will elect an SDS president and will approve a code of conduct for party members. He said the introductory address on past work and a vision for the future of the Serb Republic will be made by Dr. Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serb Republic and chairman of the SDS. [passage omitted]

"The SDS will not give in to pressure and blackmail, and will simply follow the path of the creation of the Serb Republic, which is the sole guarantor for the survival of the Serb people in this area. Thus, we will not accede to any dishonorable compromises," Vrkes said categorically. [passage omitted]

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"The SDS will not permit a puppet government to be established in the Serb Republic which might reintegrate the Serbs into some kind of unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina. The notion of 'reintegration' is in itself completely misleading because a state which has never existed cannot be reintegrated."

He pointed out that "all the pressures to which the Serb Republic has been exposed are designed to ensure the abdication of President Karadzic, to remove the SDS from power, and to cause the leadership and the people to waver in their firm intention to realize their right to their own state."

"To this end I have to say that the people will simply not allow the handing over to the Hague tribunal of a single Serb, least of all President Karadzic. The Serb Republic has formed a special war crimes' court, and we will publicly unmask all these stage-managed accusations, and the world, like on an X-ray machine, will be able to perceive what lay behind these policies."

Vrkes added that "the St. Vitus Day SDS assembly will listen to the people" and that "the people will decide who we will put up as candidate for president of the Serb Republic. I do not see why the Croats or Muslims should take precedence over us and obtain their own state, while the Serbs do not, and here too there will be no compromises."

Commenting on yesterday's statement issued by the office of FRY President Zoran Lilic, Vrkes said that "there was no need for such a thing" and that despite earlier experiences, "the accusatorial, ultimatum-style, and threatening tones in this statement are nevertheless surprising."

"The Serb people in this area know how to recognize those who are fighting for the Serb state and those who are pushing the Serb Republic into a unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina. In essence, I believe that pressure resolves nothing, but only allows problems to build up. I repeat, we are for peace, the Serb Republic, and a common state with other Serb lands. To this end, the SDS will not yield to any pressure, and especially not to blackmail," Vrkes concluded.

B-H: Klickovic: Karadzic To Give Up Presidency After Elections

LD2606183096 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1742 GMT 26 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 26 Jun (TANJUG)—Prior to this evening's session of the government of the Serb Republic in Banja Luka, Gojko Klickovic, prime minister of the Serb Republic, confirmed the withdrawal of Radovan Karadzic from the post of president of the Bosnian Serb Republic, and added that he will not head the party list of the Serb Democratic Party [SDS] in the elections.

Klickovic said that Karadzic will remain in his current post until the elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina; in some tasks he will be represented by Biljana Plavsic, vice president of the Serb Republic, while, after the elections, Karadzic will remain only as president of the SDS.

Karadzic acceded to his withdrawal under certain conditions, and these relate to the issue of the sovereignty of the Serb Republic and international guarantees for its security, and the issue of Brcko, Klickovic said.

Klickovic did not give any further details of the conditions of Karadzic's withdrawal.

B-H: Klickovic Confirms Karadzic To Stay Party Leader

LD2606205396 Pale Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 26 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The destruction of eight high-voltage pylons near Brcko the [words indistinct] electricity system of the Serb Republic. [passage omitted] This was discussed at the session of the government which is still under way. Immediately prior to the session, Prime Minister Gojko Klickovic said Dr. Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serb Republic, had decided to remain in this post until the elections.

[Correspondent] By 5 July work will be completed on repairs to transmission pylons and it is expected that supplies of electricity to the western part of the Serb Republic will then be normalized. This was stated at the session of the government of the Serb Republic, which began this evening in Banja Luka, presided over by Prime Minister Gojko Klickovic. [passage omitted]

Prior to the start of the government session, asked by journalists about the accuracy of reports in certain media about the alleged withdrawal of Dr. Radovan Karadzic from his post of president of the Serb Republic, Prime Minister Klickovic said:

[Begin Klickovic recording] In the situation in which Yugoslavia and Serbia have found themselves, [words indistinct] the pressure of the international community, President Karadzic has decided himself to remain at the head of his party and to retain the position he has had since 1990 or rather 1991, but not to participate in this part of party [words indistinct]. It was agreed that President Karadzic should remain until the end of the elections, that is [words indistinct] and to carry out his functions with the same powers as agreed [words indistinct] in the presidency; in other words, he remains

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and after that he will concentrate on party work. [end recording]

[Correspondent] The government session, with 21 items on the agenda, is still going on.

B-H: Government Says Hague 'Only Place' for Karadzic

AU2706065596 Paris AFP in English 2058 GMT 26 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Belgrade, June 26 (AFP)—Bosnian Serb "president" Radovan Karadzic will not run in upcoming elections, the Serbs' prime minister Gojko Klickovic said Wednesday in the northern Bosnian town of Banja Luka, the TANJUG agency reported.

The announcement received a cautious welcome from the High Representative Carl Bildt, but the Sarajevo government said the Bosnian Serbs were simply continuing to mock the international community.

"We will believe it when we get solid communications of that, when we receive it we will believe it," Bildt's spokesman Colum Murphy told AFP.

But the spokesman said Bildt would stick by his demand for Karadzic's complete removal from the political arena: "We have demanded his removal from public life." [passage omitted]

The Bosnian Government in Sarajevo refused to give credence to the Bosnian Serb announcement.

"The only place for Karadzic is in The Hague," said Mizra Hajric, an advisor to Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic.

"Until that happens there is always the chance of Karadzic doing this kind of silly thing," he added. "The international community should not go for less than sending Karadzic to The Hague." [passage omitted]

Yugoslavia, now made up only of the republics of Serbia and Montenegro, called Tuesday for the Bosnian Serb parliament to "immediately name an interim president" to replace Karadzic.

B-H: Serb PM Explains Mladic Status 'Clarified in Florence'

LD2606185096 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 26 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka 26 Jun (SRNA)—Today in Banja Luka, Serb Republic Prime Minister Gojko Klickovic denied speculation that Serb Republic President Radovan Karadzic has withdrawn from his post and will no longer perform any political activities. Klickovic, in a statement for [words indistinct] that owing to the terrible pressure of the international community and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, President Karadzic, in agreement with the leadership of the Serb Republic, has decided not to take part in the forthcoming elections and head the party list.

"It was agreed with Dr. Karadzic that he will retain the political status he had in 1990 and 1991 [passage indistinct]."

Commenting on the position of General Ratko Mladic, commander of the main headquarters of the Serb army, Klickovic explained that many things were clarified in Florence, because Gen. Mladic does not have any political function; he only carries out professional duties.

B-H: Serb Army General Warns of 'Unstable' Post-Dayton Peace

LD2606170696 Pale Srpska Radio-Televizija First Program Serb Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 26 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] On the occasion of St. Vitus' Day, the day of the patron saint of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, General Manojlo Milovanovic, chief of the general staff of the Serb Republic army, and Gen. Milan Gvero and General Petar Skrbic, assistants to the chief of general staff of our army, held a news conference in Banja Luka today. Ljiljana Kovacevic has a report:

[Begin recording] [Kovacevic] [Passage omitted] The Serb Republic army has complied with all provisions of the military part of the Dayton agreement, Gen. Milovanovic said. He warned that the post-Dayton peace is unstable, primarily due to the insatiable appetites of the Muslims and Croats; this imposes a need for better training of officers, commands, soldiers, and units, and for the transformation and better organization of the Armed Forces of our republic.

In light of the fact that the current peace is unstable, one should not forget the defense of our country, Gen. Milovanovic said, highlighting the following as the priority tasks for the state bodies:

[Milovanovic] The maintaining and equipping of our army, the resolution of the welfare status of our soldiers, war invalids, families of fallen soldiers, and the release of our soldiers from Croat and Muslim prisons must be resolved as a matter of urgency, because the survival of the Serb Republic depends on it.

[Kovacevic] The chief of general staff of the Serb Republic said that the army must remain apolitical, and that the forthcoming elections should have no influence on the Armed Forces of our country.

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Asked by journalists whether the Serb Republic army has launched an initiative to establish responsibility for the fall of the western part of the Serb Republic in autumn last year, Gen. Milovanovic said that the general staff set up a commission back in October 1995 to examine the responsibility of all officers, after which some officers were replaced and criminal proceedings instituted against them. The responsibility of civilian authorities was also examined and documentation on this was forwarded to the state leadership of the Serb Republic, he stated.

Foreign journalists were interested in the whereabouts and present activities of Serb Republic army Commander Colonel Gen. Ratko Mladic.

Gen. Mladic is at his headquarters and is performing his duties, Gen. Milovanovic replied. He did not elaborate on whether Gen. Mladic will take part in the main celebration of St Vitus' Day in Banja Luka or not.

Denying the credibility of the Hague tribunal, the generals said today that the Hague international tribunal was directly responsible for General Djukic's death; he was illegally accused and tried despite his serious state of health. [passage omitted] [end recording]

B-H: RS Gen. Milovanovic Comments on Mladic's Position

AU2706102096 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1717 GMT 26 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Banja Luka, 26 June (BETA)—General Manojlo Milovanovic, chief of the Serb Republic [RS] army Staff, said today that the military bodies of the Serb Republic have completed an analysis determining responsibility for the loss of 13 municipalities in the fall offensive, and that they have passed the entire documentation to the state leadership.

At a press conference on the occasion of St. Vitus Day, St. Vitus is the patron saint of the RS army, Milovanovic said that in those operations the enemy's forces were technically stronger by a 20:1 ratio, and 12:1 in terms of personnel, since the Bosnia-Herzegovina Croats and Muslims were aided by the Croatian Army and NATO air power.

Milovanovic rejected the possibility that the RS army would stand beside any party or individual at the forthcoming elections, and said that every soldier and officer of the RS army will vote for the party that offers the best program for the future of the people. [passage omitted]

Asked whether Gen. Ratko Mladic is still in command and whether he will attend the central ceremony in Banja Luka, Milutinovic answered that Mladic is not in command but in a command position of the RS army, and whether he will attend the ceremony depends on him personally.

Milovanovic disputed the legitimacy of the Hague Tribunal, stating that this tribunal is an accomplice to the killing of Gen. Milan Djukic, since for 13 days he was prevented from taking the medicine he needed.

B-H: Mladic Sends Greetings to Citizens on St. Vitus Day

LD2606152496 Pale Srpska Radio-Televizija First Program Serb Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 26 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] On the occasion of St. Vitus Day, patron saints' day, and Bosnian Serb Republic Army Day, Colonel General Ratko Mladic has sent the following greetings' message:

Officers, junior officers, soldiers, and workers in the Bosnian Serb Republic army: I send greetings to you on St. Vitus Day, the Day of the Bosnian Serb Republic's army, and I greet the Serb people, the Orthodox priesthood and the authorities on this great spiritual and state holiday.

The Bosnian Serb Republic army, the Serb people, the Orthodox priesthood and the Serb Republic are celebrating St. Vitus Day in peace and freedom for the first time in 1996, preserving and cherishing the best traditions and customs of the Serb people in an honorable and dignified way, and renewing remembrance of the brilliant moments in their history.

Peace, national, and spiritual freedom, honor and dignity, and the Serb Republic, are a result of the four-year struggle by the Serb people and their army, which was heroically and superbly led in conditions of an imbalance of forces and against a numerically stronger enemy. In this unequal battle the Bosnian Serb Republic army achieved brilliant results and, on this occasion too, I pay tribute to you for this, and give my sad respects to those who were killed.

The peace which the Serb people and the Serb Republic currently enjoy is insecure and unstable, because our enemies, helped by those who hold power in the world, have not achieved their desired goals, and those in power in the world have not achieved them either.

Hence in the period ahead, taking advantage of our know-how, experience, high level of organization of work, persistence and willingness to make sacrifices, we have to focus our activities on the training of officers, soldiers, and units so that they are able to carry out successfully tasks entrusted to them for the defense of

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the freedom and integrity of the Serb Republic and the interests of the Serb people.

May the spirit of St. Vitus Day, the Orthodox faith, the results achieved in the four-year war and the confidence achieved during it, comradeship, experience and the traditions of the units inspire your performance of these peacetime tasks, says the greetings' message sent by Col. Gen. Ratko Mladic, commander of the Serb army, on St. Vitus Day to members of the army, the Serb people, the priesthood, and the authorities of our state.

B-H: RS Accused of Cutting Power for 'Political' Reasons

AU2606191396 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 26 Jun 96

[Report by Branisalv Bozic from Banja Luka]

[FBIS Translated Text] More then a half of the Serb Republic [RS] has again been without electricity since Friday. Although the officials are talking about technical reasons for the umpteenth time, it appears that these reasons are of a political nature. Branislav Bozic reports from Banja Luka:

[Bozic] All factories west of Brcko have again stopped working completely. The modest stocks of food in the households' freezers have perished completely. The small hydropower plant in Bocac provides electricity only for some water systems and hospitals. Everyone else is in total darkness.

The official explanation is that power pylons near Brcko were knocked down. The situation and the explanation are very familiar. This has happened on many occasions in the past four years. Power cuts always occurred when relations between Pale and Banja Luka were beginning to cool. These relations, of course, are political relations.

This time, the state leadership in Pale started to worry seriously, and with a reason, as the standing of their Serb Democratic Party is deteriorating increasingly in this part of the RS. More and more parties are rallying around the local Socialists. A coalition election bloc, called the Alliance for Peace and Progress [Savez za Mir i Progres], has already been formed here. A large number of parties from the center is also rallying around Mayor Radic and the Democratic Patriotic Front.

Unable to prevent the speedy fall of their popularity prior to the upcoming elections, Pale started to make moves to discipline the residents of Krajina according to the already set pattern. They first disconnected the electricity and then ordered the replacement of Banja Luka Mayor Predrag Radic. The same happened when they eliminated unconstitutionally the Banja Luka deputies, Andjelko Grahovac, and Radoslav Brdjanin, Prime Minister Rajko Kasagic, and a number of others. This is not being done without skill.

Nikola Erceg from Banja Luka, a man of the highest trust, has been appointed director of the RS power industry. He is inclined to make big promises, little work, and big [word indistinct]

The local NEZAVISNE NOVINE perhaps explained the situation best when it commented on the situation with a single sentence: The latest darkness will, perhaps, help the minority in power in Banja Luka to finally see.

B-H: Klickovic Promises To Restore Power by 15 Jul

LD2606184396 Pale Srpska Radio-Televizija First Program Serb Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 26 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Gojko Klickovic, prime minister of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, said in Banja Luka today that the faults that led to the interruption of electricity in Krajina [northwestern Bosnia] and Posavina [northeastern Bosnia] should be rectified by 15 July.

Prime Minister Klickovic, Energy Minister Milorad Skoko, and Finance Minister Novak Kondic had talks with Nedeljko Gavrilovic, chairman of the executive committee of the Banja Luka municipal council, on the new energy situation in Krajina and Posavina. Here is a report by Mijo Jandric:

[Begin recording] [Jandric] Following an act of vandalism on 22 June, which saw the removal and theft of (?high tension) steel elements from pylons carrying a 110-kilovolt power line in Gorice near Brcko and led to the destruction of eight pylons covering a 2.5-km stretch of land, the western part of the Serb Republic, from Brcko to Mrkonjic Grad and (?Novi Grad) [Bosanski Novi], is without electricity—except for (?priority consumers) who are receiving electricity from the (?Bocac) power station. Industry has virtually come to a halt, and private homes have no electricity whatsoever.

We asked Prime Minister Klickovic what the government is doing to solve this problem as quickly as possible.

[Klickovic] What is new is that we have managed to secure funds and obtained guarantees from all those in the electricity supply and distribution industry that they will (?do everything on time). Today you heard that the completion of repairs on this power line, which will ease the problem and the energy situation, will be finished by 15 July, you heard that. We also obtained guarantees that there will be no delays in carrying out repair work to thermoelectric power

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stations, which are now a main source of electricity for us. Today we obtained assurances from Ugljevik [thermoelectric power station], because significant funds have been invested there for repair work and equipment. So everything shows that the whole government is concentrating on solving this problem. I think (?Jaksic) said that the fate of these areas depends on energy. [end recording] [passage indistinct]

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Croatia: Tudjman, Kornblum Discuss B-H Elections, Karadzic

LD2606161096 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 26 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] We begin our news bulletin with a report from Zoltan Kabok from the presidential palace.

[Kabok] Dr. Franjo Tudjman, president of the republic, today received John Kornblum, U.S. assistant secretary of state and coordinator for Bosnia-Herzegovina. Elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina, scheduled for September, and the problems surrounding war criminal Radovan Karadzic were the main topics of the talks with the Croatian president.

President Tudjman said Croatia was firmly committed to implementing both the Washington and Dayton agreements and, by implication, the defense law [in the Bosnia-Herzegovina federation] but said it was not fair to constantly demand concessions from Croatia alone. Both sides stressed determination to see the elections in Mostar and in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as a whole, held in line with the peace agreements to install authority in the federation and in the cantons in particular.

Following his talks with President Tudjman, John Kornblum, U.S. assistant secretary of state, made a statement in which he described his meeting with the Croatian president as exceptionally useful and constructive. A whole series of topics relating to Croatian-U.S. relations and the Dayton Agreement were discussed. I told the Croatian president, Kornblum said, that foundations were in place for the elections and for a federal government. We will have to ensure that the Serb entity also implements the Dayton Agreement. This means that Karadzic must give up power and must not be allowed to have any influence in the Serb entity, John Kornblum said.

Croatia: Slavonia Serbs Ordered To Accept Authority or Leave

LD2606152796 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1200 GMT 26 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] [Correspondent Zeljka Bacic] The fact that people could not travel to Sarvas to attend holy mass on St. John the Baptist Day on Monday [24 June] was an attempt to place obstacles in the process of peaceful reintegration [of Serb-held areas in Croatia], Ivica Vrkic, head of the Croatian Government's interim administration office, said at an emergency news conference today. The Serb side stipulated the number and identity of Croatian refugees who would be allowed to enter Sarvas but Croatia cannot give in to blackmail of the people who wanted to occupy our land and destroy our churches, Vrkic said, adding that the Serb police forces under the transitional administration did not want to be part of the peaceful process of reintegration. About 250 Serbs from Tenja, Bobota, and Vera, both settlers from western Slavonia and local people, organized a protest meeting in Sarvas on Monday to stop the Croats from coming. This was a blow to the UNTAES [UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia] as well, which, if the people continue to be allowed to take power in their own hand, will not be able to carry out its tasks.

According to Vrkic, we will continue to exercise tolerance but will not give in to blackmail or plead with anyone to accept peace. His message to those who are not prepared to live in Croatia is—leave the area. Croatian refugees must be given the opportunity to at least pray in their churches.

In anticipation of the growing role of the civilian authorities after the process of demilitarization, the government's office submitted to UNTAES a list of churches and saints' days in individual parishes.

Croatia: Army Urged To Lose Party Rule, Adjust to NATO

AU2606123696 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 18 Jun 96 p 6

[Commentary by Danko Plevnik: "Depoliticization of the Army"]

[FBIS Translated Text] After numerous postponements and complications, the agreement on subregional arms control, which regulates relationships between the armed forces of the Republic of Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Serbian Republic, was signed in Florence—which means that the Croatian military power has been established in the Balkans and with Balkan criteria. After his meeting with Tudjman, Milosevic and Izetbegovic in Geneva on 2 June, the U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher said the following: "I have just finished the meeting with the three Balkan presidents." Why did Christopher not speak in a way that the whole Croatian regime would understand him, for in the politically correct Croatian language one has to say that he met with two Balkan presidents and one Mediterranean, Central European one? He thus seemed to place himself among those who push Croatia to the Balkans and to ignore the fact that Croatia is the most important strategic ally of the United States in this region (which region?). A strange sort of state secretary if he does not know all that.

Why, for example, has Kucan [president of Slovenia] not been defined as a Balkan president? Because he is

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FYROM: U.S. Military Delegation Arrives for Talks

LD2606163596 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1224 GMT 26 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Skopje, 26 Jun (SRNA)—A high-ranking U.S. military delegation, headed by Franklin Kramer, assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, arrived in Skopje today.

The U.S. delegation, which includes Lieutenant General Thomas Rhame, director of the Defense Security Assistance Agency, will have talks with representatives of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM] Defense Ministry about training and equipping the Macedonian army.

This is the third meeting between high-ranking U.S. and FYROM military leaders to discuss bilateral military relations. The first meeting was held in Skopje in November 1994 and the second in Washington in May 1995.

FYROM: Gligorov Receives Credentials of FRY Ambassador

LD2606164196 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1627 GMT 26 Jun 96

["Balpool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Skopje, June 26 (TANJUG)—Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov, who on Wednesday received credentials from the first ambassador of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to Skopje, said that the development of relations between the two countries would contribute to peace and stability in the Balkans.

'We want to improve good-neighbourly relations with Yugoslavia based on the principles of equality, non-interference and the respect of territorial integrity and sovereignty,' Gligorov told Ambassador Zoran Janackovic.

Janackovic expressed belief that the joint interest is the strengthening and development of all forms of bilateral cooperation, especially mutually useful economic and trade relations.

He said that good and friendly relations between the two countries represent the best framework for mutual efforts in preserving and promoting the protection of national rights of Serbs in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] and Macedonians in Yugoslavia.

Macedonian Foreign Minister Ljubomir Frckoski also attended the ceremony of handing over the credentials.

Janackovic said in a separate statement that teams of experts of both governments are working hard to determine concrete documents which should regulate and stimulate more intensive Yugoslav-Macedonian cooperation.

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Poland: Ukrainian President Addresses Sejm

LD2606180696 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1006 GMT 26 Jun 96

[Address by Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma to the Sejm in Warsaw; Kuchma speaks in Ukrainian with superimposed translation into Polish—live]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Kuchma] Esteemed Mr. President! Esteemed Mr. Speaker! Esteemed Deputy Speaker of the Senate! Esteemed Deputies! Above all, I would like to thank you for inviting me to address you from the lofty Sejm tribune. This is a special event for me. The life of every political figure, especially of a head of state, is full of many events, but only some of them, by dint of their importance, will remain forever in one's memory. Today's address is just such an event.

This is the second time this month that I have visited Poland at the invitation of President Kwasniewski. The first time was to take part in the summit of the leaders of East European countries, and now I am on an official visit. A few days before my arrival, there was a meeting of the revived consultative committee of the presidents of Ukraine and Poland. Poland has recently been visited by several Ukrainian ministers, and there have been many important politological conferences devoted to our state. All of this testifies to the genuine renaissance of Ukraine in Poland. Such intense contacts prove that our relations are beginning to be based on qualitatively new criteria.

If we look carefully and sensibly, to be blunt, at the sometimes complex and tragic past, we can see that the fates of Ukraine and Poland were not only closely and mutually linked but also mutually dependent. After all, over the centuries we have lived together shoulder to shoulder, edging closer to the treasure house of European civilization and culture. We lost and regained our independence almost at the same time. A joint historical fate has befallen our countries in present-day history, too. Both countries suffered tremendous losses, but, despite this, they came out victorious in World War II, came through attempts to impose totalitarian regimes on them, and regained genuine freedom at the beginning of the 1990's. Right now they have made their final choice so as to occupy an honorable place, which they deserve and which is in accordance with their rights, in a free and democratic Europe.

The fact that Poland was the first, on 2 December 1991, to recognize the young Ukrainian state will remain forever in the history of modern Ukrainian-Polish relations. This puts straight the well-known maxim that all that history can teach us is that it teaches us nothing. No, it taught our nations that they must be conscious of the fact that we can attain real results only along the path of peace and accord through mutually respecting and supporting each other. In this connection, we ought to quote the prophetic words of Jozef Pilsudski [held various top state positions from November 1918], the great son of Poland: Without an independent Ukraine, there can be no independent Poland. [applause]

Let us thus leave all of the problems of the past to historians. Let us take from the past only what joined and brought us closer together. We have to make great efforts to ensure that the relations between our peoples become exemplary and like those that ought to exist between good neighbors, leading states of the continent. I trust that you will agree with my opinion that our joint final goal should be to achieve the happy day when the average Poles sees in the average Ukrainian, and vice versa, his friend and brother. We need this both now and in the future. The first signs of spiritual rebirth will most promote this process. They are already visible in the sphere of our humanitarian links, based on the tremendous foundations of the kinship between our two cultures.

It is enough to recall the joint schools of church painting, architecture, poetry, music, and folk art. It is for this reason, therefore, that I state with particular pleasure that current Ukrainian-Polish relations are developing toward strategic partnership. This is promoted not only by the fact that we are close neighbors and have joint historical and cultural traditions, but above all by joint tasks and a joint choice, in the awareness of responsibility for peace and security in Europe, in the desire to make our important contribution to the cause of their consolidation.

We also recognize the contribution of those of our predecessors who, with shrewdness and courage in a complicated situation, laid lasting foundations for cooperation between Kiev and Warsaw. At present, it is no longer enough only to talk about strategic relations. They should be filled with a specific content. How does the Ukrainian side see this? The most important task in foreign policy is for us the confirmation of Ukraine as a Central European state with full rights. We are grateful to Poland for the support it has consistently given and gives to Ukraine in the international arena, particularly as regards entry to the Council of Europe and the Central European Initiative, drawing the attention of such influential institutions as the EU and the Western European Union [WEU] to the needs and interests of our state. I would like to thank President Kwasniewski once again for his invitation to Lancut [CEI summit], which initiated a positive tradition for Ukraine. At present, however, it is not enough just to recognize us

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as an important partner. The next logical step should be taken—namely, to support our political choice of integration with Europe and let Ukraine join the club of states of the Central European Initiative, which are actively entering into rapprochement with the EU and the WEU.

I stress once again: Our choice is conscious and final. Taking economic problems into account, Ukraine cannot, of course, at present ask for membership in the above-mentioned institutions, but there are no foundations for discriminating against our country regarding cooperation with them in the political and military-political fields. After all, in the security sphere, we are not consumers but producers. This is shown particularly convincingly by our activeness in the UN peace forces and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Africa, and Asia, by participation in the peacekeeping forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

How, in the existing conditions, can Ukraine shorten its road to the EU and the WEU? In our opinion, the optimum variant would be the simultaneous beginning of negotiations on a free trade zone with the EU, and Ukraine's partial participation in the EU as an associate member. On the other hand, this would enable the formal reservations about giving Ukraine the status of an associate partner in the WEU to be removed. We are aware of the complexity of this issue. Its resolution requires political courage and foresight, a departure from fixed models and stereotypes, but the dynamics of contemporary life require precisely this approach. I am sincerely counting on your support in this matter.

As regards Poland, we have sincerely supported your strivings for the quickest possible integration into European structures from the outset, and we wish you success with this. We think that friendly Ukrainian-Polish relations, in which there are no serious problems of any kind, will speed up Poland's achievement of the goal it has set itself.

I am also deeply convinced that Poland's active and consistent Eastern policy will promote its increased importance in Europe. We do not see any threat in the fact that the broadening of the EU and the WEU will mean that they have, through Poland—before we join them—a common border with Ukraine. On the contrary, we are glad at our neighbor's successes and also that the zone of economic stability and security, which we too will join in the end, will come still closer to us.

The only thing we would like to avoid is that the expansion of the EU and the WEU should, even for a short time, define the eastern border of the new Europe. Its doors should be permanently open to those who want to enter them later. And one more thing: We should already be thinking today about how we are to prevent such a situation from arising, where Poland's joining the EU would cause a weakening of the political, humanitarian, and cultural links to Ukraine, a curtailment of the freedom to cross our borders.

Continuing the theme of the possible directions of implementing relations of strategic partnership, of mutual aid in foreign policy, I would like to stress the prospective importance of the idea of Ukraine's joining the Weimar Triangle. I am convinced that the development of cooperation between Kiev, Warsaw, Bonn, and Paris would mean an end to the threat of new dividing lines arising on the continent and would promote the creation of a zone of security and stability unprecedented in the history of Europe. This would, in turn, make it impossible for any serious conflicts to arise on the continent. Such a zone could be formed from two sides, the Western and the Eastern, gradually getting closer to each other. In this respect, it is a very important task, in our opinion, to strengthen cooperation with the above-mentioned countries.

In the sphere of military-political cooperation, the particular Ukrainian-Polish contribution to this could be to get a formal joint battalion in peacekeeping operations, including under the auspices of the United Nations, the WEU, and NATO, and also in the combined tactical forces of NATO and the WEU.

I would like to dwell separately on the economic aspects of Ukrainian-Polish relations. Poland is Ukraine's traditional important trade and economic partner. This is seen in the fact that it is in first place among the Central-East European countries and fourth among the countries of the world, as regards trade turnover with Ukraine.

Last year was, in our opinion, in many respects a breakthrough year in the development of economic relations between our countries. Foreign trade turnover doubled compared to 1994. Manufacturing coproduction activities intensified. This is evidence of the correctness of the principles we have chosen governing mutual economic relations and of their matching our mutual interests. But there are still great reserves for deepening our trade and economic relations. In my opinion, they ought to be based on the principles of the openness of the economies of both countries and of the removal of any artificial restrictions and barriers along the road of the development of mutual trade relations. I am profoundly convinced that in this context the creation of a free trade zone between the two states should be the next step in our economic cooperation.

We are interested in the activation of investment cooperation and in the intensive and mutual penetration

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of investment, fiscal and commercial capital. Ukraine is completely open to Polish investors. This refers to all forms of investment activity, including participation in the privatization process. The agroindustrial complex, the pharmaceutical industry, and the manufacture of military equipment and of spare parts for it are also promising spheres for cooperation. Maybe it would be useful for our enterprises to enter the markets of other countries together, particularly the former Soviet Union and the so-called Third World.

The role of the parliaments of the two countries and the personal role of each one of you, esteemed deputies, in the creation of a legal basis for our cooperation must be assessed highly. I know that foreign, including Polish, businessmen and investors are still viewing cooperation with Ukraine with reserve because they have doubts as regards its future economic development. I can assure you in all seriousness that there will be no return to the past, to the administrative-command system. The aim of the latest changes in our government is to accelerate and not to slow down reforms. We are progressing along this path slowly but surely. Macroeconomic stability has been achieved, and inflation, which, for instance, came to 0.7 percent in May, has been conquered. Small-scale privatization, in general, has already been carried out, exports are increasing, the structure of these exports is being improved, and so on. So one has to decide, and this has to be done immediately, because tomorrow our marketplace might be unable to find room for all those who want to enter it.

Esteemed ladies and gentlemen! The process of transformation that encompasses all countries of Central and East Europe is also connected with a search for one's place in a new Pan-European security structure. In accordance with our convictions, it is to include all interested countries of the Euro-Atlantic area and is to be based on international structures and institutions that already exist, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the European Union, NATO, the Western European Union, the Council of Europe, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, and the Partnership for Peace program. Subregional organizations such as the Council of Baltic Countries, the Northern Council, Black Sea Economic Cooperation, and others should also play an important role here.

The main task, in our opinion, is that, while these institutions are being adapted to match present-day requirements and realities, an effective mechanism should be found for sharing the work so as to prevent unnecessary duplication of what they do and to organize close cooperation on the basis of the principles of their mutually complementing one another and of partnership. Work on the model of general and common security for Europe of the 21st century, which is being done within the OSCE framework, will also promote this.

While on the subject of the way we view the new security structure, we must not fail to mention the sensitive matter of the expansion of NATO. Ukraine—and we have declared this on many occasions—has not opposed and does not oppose in principle the concept of expanding the Atlantic alliance. But we think that, in the implementation of this concept, because of the need to observe the principle of the indivisibility of security and of avoiding new lines of division in Europe, the primary interests in the sphere of security of all countries, particularly Ukraine, should be safeguarded appropriately. This applies, above all, to the matter of the deployment of nuclear weapons and foreign troops on the territory of neighboring states. This is why Ukraine has proposed the creation in Central and East Europe of a nonnuclear zone that would encompass the whole of the region from the Baltic to the Black Sea. This meets, in our opinion, the strategic interests in the sphere of the national security of all countries of the region without exception. We are aware of the fact that the implementation of this concept requires time.

A high level of trust is a characteristic feature of our relations. Taking into account this fact and also our attitude toward NATO as a factor of stability and security in Europe, we do not have any reservations about Poland's joining NATO. At the same time, one should not forget that far from all states, whose interests in the sphere of security will be affected by the expansion of the alliance, have such a stance on this issue. In opposing the right of veto by any state that is not a NATO member and respecting the sovereign choice of those states that wish to become NATO members, Ukraine is not indifferent as to how the process of the eastward expansion of the North Atlantic alliance might proceed. Will the existing realities be taken into account during this process? Will everything take place according to the standards of the Cold War and military confrontation? This is the crux of this problem.

We support an evolutionary approach to the matter of the expansion of NATO. The transformation of NATO into a broader Euro-Atlantic security structure based not on the concept of collective defense but on the mutually acceptable concept of collective security should take place simultaneously with, and if possible ahead of, expansion. Ukraine is at present expanding and intensifying cooperation with NATO. This is developing mainly at the level of the Partnership for Peace program and of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. We can also see this going on within a broader framework, in particular through the establishment of a special partner-

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ship. At the same time as doing this, we are consistently expanding cooperation at regional and subregional levels, viewing this as being an important means of integration with the Pan-European area. Our immediate aim in this sphere is to join the Central European Free Trade Association [CEFTA].

As regards the future model of European security, I would like to stress that it has to take into account also the interests of states that are outside any bloc to which Ukraine belongs today. The system of continental security is doomed to failure if they end up in the so-called gray zone. It is fundamentally important that, when the role of this or that state is defined in the system of European institutions, realistic and not formal factors should be taken into account. The orientation chosen by a particular state, its favorable attitude toward fundamental values of European civilization, and its ability to implement them are the main thing. I am very worried about the dangerous tendency that views the participation of Ukraine in the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS] as being a barrier to its joining fully in cooperation with individual European organizations. I drew detailed attention to this matter in my recent speech at the parliamentary assembly of the Western European Union. Let me just repeat that neither norm-setting legal documents signed by Ukraine nor our form of participation in CIS remove or restrict freedom of choice. Is the construction of a new Iron Curtain or a Berlin Wall really necessary only to then have to waste a lot of effort tearing them down?

Let me ask you one more question on the solution of which the future of our joint European home depends to a large extent. This problem is the recognition and taking account of the interests of a democratic Russia. I stress the word democratic because we will not need a totalitarian Russia. We should therefore together support the progressive forces in Russia, think about what more we can do at this decisive time for it and for us and you too. I will (?say) one more thing: Neither Poland nor Ukraine nor the rest of the countries of the Central European Initiative should become hostages to satisfying anybody's ambitions. It is impermissible to give up the sovereignty, the vital and legal interests of states, in the name of support for democracy in another country, however important it may be. After all, both security and independence are the guarantee of the irrevocability of the democratic transformations in Russia. It should not be forgotten either that the success of the democratic reforms in Poland and particularly in Ukraine will be an additional incentive for corresponding processes in Russia.

Esteemed ladies and gentlemen! The changes and modifications taking place in the European political sphere force every country to consider and set out its priorities once again. For Ukraine's foreign policy, they consist of creating an international community that would fully guarantee its national security and the essential external conditions for the reform and expansion of the national economy. In this context, the development and consolidation of all-around cooperation with Poland is one of our priorities. It is very important that your country, too, should keep to an analogical approach.

It should be remembered that together we account for more than 90 million citizens of Europe, a region of the greatest strategic importance, of unique industrial, agricultural, scientific and technical, and intellectual potential. A Ukrainian-Polish strategic partnership is the factor that could prevent many disasters, which were once the cause of so much suffering and misfortune to our nations and the whole continent, the whole world. This is why I cannot but cite in conclusion the words of the distinguished son of the Ukrainian nation, Taras Shevchenko [poet and revolutionary]: Give your hand, friend and brother Pole, to the Cossack; open up your heart to him, and together, in the name of Christ, we will rebuild our quiet paradise. Thank you for your attention. [applause]

Poland: Warsaw Press Reaction to Kuchma Visit

WS2706111096

[FBIS Report] On 27 June two major Warsaw vernacular dailies, RZECZPOSPOLITA and GAZETA WYBORCZA, carried editorial comment on the visit by Ukrainian President Kuchma.

RZECZPOSPOLITA ran on page five a 300-word commentary by Jan Skorzynski entitled "A Door to Europe." Skorzynski quotes a sentence from the declaration signed by the two presidents in Warsaw, which reads that "the existence of an independent Ukraine is a factor conducive to strengthening the independence of Poland, just as the existence of an independent Poland is conducive to strengthening the independence of Ukraine." He adds, however, that "grand words about friendship between nations do not mean much unless there is a sense of national interests behind them. Today both in Kiev and in Warsaw this conviction certainly prevails." Skorzynski recalls that, when "Kiev declared establishment of the Ukrainian state in 1991, Warsaw was the first to recognize the independence of the eastern neighbor." According to him, "there are no major problems in Polish-Ukrainian relations today, which speaks well for the Solidarity governments as well as for the historic and geopolitical sobriety of Poles, who have resigned themselves to the fact that the former eastern parts of the Polish Republic are now an integral part of Ukraine."

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As far as the future is concerned, Skorzynski writes that "Poland, which is trying to join the EU, has an important role to play for Ukraine." He quotes Leonid Kuchma, who said in the Sejm that the Ukrainians "do not want the expansion of the EU and the Western European Union [WEU] to mark the eastern border of Europe. Its door should be permanently open for those who want to join it later on." Skorzynski believes that "Poland's task is to see to it that this door is not closed."

GAZETA WYBORCZA carried on page two a 350-word commentary by Grzegorz Gromadzki and Wojciech Maziarski entitled "The Ukrainian Path." The authors write that "Leonid Kuchma came to Warsaw with a clear message: Independent Ukraine is headed for Europe and is counting on the fact that Poland will support it. Warsaw also gave a clear message: We want Ukraine to become part of the European structures, and we will help it achieve this goal as much as we can." They note that "what Kiev needs today is not declarations or words of recognition, but concrete help—both political and economic. We do not have money to spare. The West must provide the cash if it wants to attract Ukraine. All we can do is help the Ukrainians reform their economy." Discussing the problems that Ukraine is facing in its foreign policy, Gromadzki and Maziarski point out that "Ukraine, which is treated by Moscow as the so-called near abroad, must show more restraint than Poland. This is the reason that, for the time being, it is not speaking about joining NATO, but only about a special partnership with the alliance. It is speaking about joining the EU and its military arm, the WEU. The path Ukraine is traveling is extremely narrow, but the direction seems to be rather obvious."

Poland: Solana Interviewed on NATO Enlargement

WS2606143496 Warsaw SZTANDAR in Polish 26 Jun 96 p 4

[Interview with NATO Secretary General Javier Solana by Wojciech Luczak in Warsaw; date not given: "It Is Safer and Cheaper Together"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Luczak] The scenario according to which Poland is to become a full member of NATO is gradually unfolding. At the summit scheduled to take place in Brussels in December, a decision is to be made on holding a special conference in Washington. In the spring or fall of 1997, its participants will offer membership to several countries from Central Europe. Poland will be among them...

[Solana] This scenario has nothing to do with the current reality. None of the decisions you mentioned are finite. I can say, however, that we are holding individual talks with candidate states. In December we will assess the situation and decide what to do next. It would not be sensible for me to hypothesize what might happen next. I do wish to stress that the individual NATO dialogue with Poland is proceeding extraordinarily well. Your Discussion Paper—the document that provides the basis for negotiations—received rave reviews. It focuses on very interesting issues and poses a number of specific questions. We are very happy with such an approach. The fact that the international NATO Workshop was held in Warsaw is also very significant. Please note that we chose Poland as the venue for a discussion on the future of the alliance immediately after the Berlin summit.

[Luczak] Does that mean you exclude the possibility of a special session during which NATO would officially decide to enlarge in 1997?

[Solana] I do not exclude anything. Neither do I wish to suggest anything.

[Luczak] You mentioned individual talks with states applying for membership. Some of those taking part in the dialogue claim that this is not enough to fill in the void between the most recent NATO summit, held in Berlin, and the coming December summit. Some even say months are being wasted on NATO enlargement...

[Solana] No, no, this is not a waste of time. We are developing cooperation within the Partnership for Peace program; we are together in Bosnia. Bilateral relations between the states aspiring to join NATO and the armed forces of the alliance are crystallizing. We are answering a lot of detailed technical questions raised by the candidate states. We are talking about how to guarantee the interoperability between the armed forces of the candidate states and NATO units. You are talking with the entire alliance, which requires consultations and unanimity of the whole bloc. At the same time, an intergovernmental session of the EU is taking place, which is to prepare the groundwork for admitting new members. This should be viewed as one process. It is very important that you have a system of civilian control over the armed forces. The most significant thing, however, is that we want to jointly protect certain shared values. There is not much time left until December, and there is so much to do...

[Luczak] Let us move on to the future for a while and assume that Poland has already been invited to membership talks. Would we be given the status of an "observer" in the transition period, allowing our diplomats and military authorities to gather the necessary experience inside the alliance?

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[Solana] In NATO, you can only be either a member or cooperate as a partner for peace or sit on the North Atlantic Cooperation Council...

[Luczak] But the alliance set a precedent by granting South European states entering NATO the status of "observers"...

[Solana] That no longer applies. I believe that the ongoing intense dialogue with potential new member states will enable them to learn how the alliance works and acquire the necessary experience.

[Luczak] Opening the NATO Workshop in Warsaw, you said that the process of enlarging the alliance will be costly and that we should be prepared for that. How costly will it be?

[Solana] I cannot give you any specific figures because they depend on the resources and possibilities of the individual states. Existing NATO members will have to share those costs with you. Naturally, the benefits must outweigh the costs. Otherwise, we would never have gone ahead with this. In any case, regardless of how expensive the whole operation turns out for you, your outlays will be smaller than if you had to guarantee your own security alone. Joint security is cheaper. Within NATO, we share values, responsibilities, and the budget. This is far better than national defense policies implemented by each state separately.

[Luczak] When General Lebed recently said of NATO: "If you have $250 billion and enough health, enlarge." You refuse to comment on his words. Nevertheless, could you please clearly state whether the current members of the alliance are prepared to cover the costs of enlarging NATO to the East?

[Solana] There is a definite answer to that question already: yes. Otherwise, the alliance would not have decided to expand. It is true that parliaments of all NATO states will have to ratify the decisions that are made. I think, however, that we are very well advanced in the dialogue, and several countries will surely be invited to membership talks. This will be carried out to the end.

[Luczak] The Russians, meanwhile, are spreading rumors in Brussels that they will allow a very small group of states to join NATO, but they will do everything to make sure no others are accepted. Does the alliance have any idea of what to do with those states that want to become members but do not stand a chance of being admitted for the time being?

[Solana] I wish to say that the decision on who we invite to join the alliance will not be the topic of a worldwide debate. We will not take trends into consideration but the situation of each of the candidate states. The alliance has certain obligations toward its members, and they must be treated with utmost seriousness. The worst possible thing would be to make empty promises. Guarantees must be real. Those who will not be invited to join NATO can cooperate with us on the existing principles. We might expand the Partnership for Peace program with them in mind. The issue remains open. I do wish, however, to express solidarity with those states that will not be invited to join the alliance.

Poland: Kolodko, IMF View Main Principles of 1997 Budget

WS2606142996 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 26 Jun 96 p 9

[Article by Danuta Walewska: "The 1997 Budget According to Grzegorz Kolodko and the IMF; Lower Inflation, Growth Still High"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *"I want the budget to be based on the following projections: inflation not higher than 13 percent, gross domestic product [GDP] growth of at least 5.5 percent, and the budget deficit not bigger than 2.6 percent. These are the necessary conditions I would like not to change," RZECZPOSPOLITA was told by Grzegorz Kolodko, deputy prime minister and minister of finance. According to IMF representative Markus Rodlauer, the goals that are to be set in the 1997 budget are ambitious, particularly if one considers the fact that the parliamentary elections will be held next year. He would like to see more flexibility in the planning of the budget deficit, which would be more favorable if it were reduced to a level of 2.5 percent of the GDP. The government will debate next year's budget on Friday [28 June].*

Grzegorz Kolodko also admits that it would be easier for him to achieve the projected goals if the deficit were a little smaller. "What Poland needs today is inflation at the level of 13 percent, at the highest, and a GDP that would grow by 5 to 6 percent a year."

"It is also necessary to curb the growing rate in which short-term capital is coming in to Poland; otherwise, the projected inflation level can only be achieved by increasing the deficit in foreign trade," warns the IMF representative.

Grzegorz Kolodko, in turn, who believes that the Sejm will pass the laws whose drafts the government has already submitted to parliament, stresses the reduction of taxes in the case of both natural and legal persons. However, the government will raise the value-added tax on energy carriers from 12 to 17 percent; it will also raise the excise tax. The number of taxpayers will

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increase as well. The budget draft envisions that the tax rates on natural persons will fall to 20, 31, and 43 percent. "I would really like to reduce them to 20, 30, and 40 percent; however, this will not be possible next year," the deputy prime minister gave assurances.

"At any rate, the acceptable level of the state budget's expenditures is 126.47 billion zlotys [Z]. This is possible with the projected economic growth and efficiency of tax offices, as well as with the projected revenues from privatization, which are to reach Z3.4 billion," the IMF representative says. He believes that the expenditures that are envisioned in next year's budget are very favorable; they are to drop below 30 percent of the GDP. What Poland should try to reduce as quickly as possible is the tax rate paid by companies. In the 1997 budget, they are set at the level of 38 percent. "It is also important," Markus Rodlauer stresses, "that tariffs are falling, the border tax will be abolished, and the Polish economy will become truly competitive." However, he hesitates for a while when asked his opinion on taxes paid by natural persons. "Unless this dangerously reduces the budget's revenues, I am always in favor of lower taxes." He believes that raising the inflation-adjusted wages by 4 percent will be a very favorable measure.

"We must think about the following: What will the fixed payments in the budget be?" According to the finance minister, it will be the costs of servicing the public debt; they will be truly fixed from the economic point of view, which means that they will not be subject to negotiations. The rest will be "partially fixed" expenditures. Among these he counts social security and subsidies to the Labor Fund, to export and agricultural loans, and to the Housing Fund. In all, next year the government will have to allocate 36.9 percent of expenditures for these purposes.

The fixed character of the expenditures on social security results from demographic processes; it is known how many beneficiaries of the system there are and how many there will be. In the future, however, a discussion is bound to be held on the granting of social benefits to the third group of invalids or on changing the retirement age. Kolodko stresses that this group of people will see their standards of living raised. "However," he adds, "I will try to see to it that this growth is not excessive in comparison with the money that is earmarked for other social and development purposes."

The remaining expenditures in the public sector, current expenditures—on computers for schools, maintenance of hospitals, money for the police, for the Armed Forces—which is to come closer to NATO, and, finally, investment expenditures, will all go up by 3 percent in real terms. By international standards, such an increase in expenditures for these spheres is very high. "Poland can afford this only thanks to its rapid economic growth," says Rodlauer.

As far as privatization is concerned, the assets of the companies for sale will be contributed as share capital to the emerging retirement pension funds. It would be very bad, Kolodko believes, if the assets of the privatized companies were to be used to satisfy pay demands. "I hope that the reform of the Polish retirement system will be launched as early as this year," the IMF representative stresses. Poland really cannot delay this reform longer.

The finance minister recalls that there exists one more threat to the budget: the pressure of the election year and the consequent political pressures.

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Slovenia: Envoy Defends Visa Introduction for B-H Citizens

AU2706073296 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1330 GMT 26 Jun 96

[Telephone statement by Drago Mirosic, Slovene ambassador to Bosnia-Herzegovina, on introduction of visas for Bosnia-Herzegovina citizens, in Sarajevo on 26 June—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] Here in Bosnia-Herzegovina this measure was greeted with disapproval, naturally. We tried to justify its introduction to the Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities and I personally believe that we succeeded in making them understand that this measure was inevitable in order to regulate matters in this respect.

I must also point out as very important that our diplomatic and consular missions have the option of facilitating entry into Slovenia for businessmen from the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is undoubtedly in Slovenia's interest because our economic cooperation is already so developed at present that we must facilitate entry for businessmen who come to the Republic of Slovenia on business.

Slovenia: B-H Ambassador Calls Visas 'a Considerable Shock'

AU2606143096 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1920 GMT 25 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Ljubljana, 25 June (BETA)—The decision of the Government of Slovenia on the introduction of entry and transit visas for the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina represents not only a surprise for the Bosnia-Herzegovina public but also for those in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Embassy in Ljubljana, the ONASA agency reports.

The Bosnia-Herzegovina ambassador to Slovenia, Ugljesa Uzelac, stated that the decision "is not in accordance with statements made by individual Slovene functionaries so far and does not correspond to the character of what we have spoken about so far."

He added that it is possible that the establishment of visas will be better than the system of entry and transit that has existed until now "but that it still represents a considerable shock."

"We were convinced that we will succeed in reaching an agreement on a regime without visas for both countries," Ambassador Uzelac told the Sarajevo ONASA agency. According to him, this decision will not produce positive reactions in either Bosnia-Herzegovina or Slovenia, especially among the economists, and it could be an aggravating factor in the development of further relations between the two counties.

"It is a matter for the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government to decide as to whether it will ask the Slovene Government's to reexamine the decision, and if there is no change, I personally think that we also need to introduce visas for Slovene citizens, and that all further issues in that respect should be taken care of in a reciprocal manner," concluded Uzelac.

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Federal

FRY: Serbian President, Kornblum Conclude Talks on Bosnia

AU2706093796 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 0721 GMT 27 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 27 June (BETA)—John Kornblum, chief of the U.S. negotiating mission to the former Yugoslavia, stated early this morning, following the talks with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, that while the situation in Bosnia "is turning for the better," he could not describe the concrete results of the efforts aimed in this direction yet.

"We held very detailed talks and we considered all aspects," Kornblum told reporters at the Hyatt Regency hotel at 0100 [2300 GMT] this morning.

"I am satisfied that the things are moving in a good direction. However, I believe that it is not possible to describe the results yet," U.S. diplomat added.

Not wishing to answer reporters' questions, Kornblum announced that he was traveling to Sarajevo tomorrow and then to Lyon where he would report on the results of the talks to U.S. State Secretary Warren Christopher and U.S. President Bill Clinton.

FRY: Turkish Foreign Ministry Asked To Explain Blocked Assets

LD2606193796 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1832 GMT 26 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Ankara, June 26 (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav Embassy in Ankara has asked the Turkish Foreign Ministry and the Central Bank to explain why the assets of Yugoslav companies are still blocked in Turkey, although the U.N. Security Council suspended the sanctions against Yugoslavia seven months ago.

Turkish officials have eschewed any answer, although the government suspended the economic sanctions against F.R. Yugoslavia in mid-January, in line with U.N. Security Council resolutions.

In the meantime, a communique on a normalization of trade exchange and bilateral economic cooperation has been adopted.

Yugoslav businessmen feel uneasiness because the assets are still blocked but they are willing to renew cooperation with Turkish businessmen.

Before the outbreak of war in Bosnia, the overall trade exchange between Yugoslavia and Turkey stood at 400 million dollars. According to forecasts in early 80's, their trade exchange was expected to reach one billion dollars.

Many firms have showed interest for economic cooperation with Yugoslavia. These companies, however, are mainly owned by people from former Yugoslavia or by businessmen who had contacts with Yugoslav firms before the war.

FRY: New Electoral Law Said To Secure Ruling Party Victory

AU2706113696 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 20 Jun 96 p 8

[Commentary by Gordana Susa: "Election Fox and Stork"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] After the adopted amendments of the Law on Electoral Units for federal elections, it will most probably come to similar changes in the laws for republic elections. There has already been some talk that it was offered to divide the Serbian electorate into over 70 and the Montenegrin electorate into 14 electoral units (according to Bulatovic's promise to the opposition). In that way the majority system would consequently be secured both on the federal and on the republic elections, and in that system the ruling parties of Serbia and of Montenegro, quite certainly, would secure themselves a decisive preelection victory.

Regardless of how much the representatives from the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS] and the Social Democratic Party [SDP] try to cover their explanations with the icing of high goals and a "contribution to democracy," their motive is highly pragmatic. Aware that according to the old law they could not secure absolute power in the elections, as they have by now, but that they would have to deal with "some sort of" coalitions, they cleverly chose a system that will secure them this without any alliances. By polarizing and dividing the electorate into two parts, instead of having numerous small and unimportant parties, they ensure the marginalization of Seselj's radicals [Serbian Radical Party], but also the complete exclusion of minority parties from the election race. True, they are right when they say that these changes have not impinged on the census but, as in any majority system, the fulfillment of the election census is not a guarantee for a representative post. With this election mathematics they also count on the discord in the opposition, because, as someone said, the unification of the opposition is like trying to unify water and oil. Their common goal to win power is not sufficient to overcome their different programs, and vice versa. [passage omitted]

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FRY: Television Coverage of Political Parties Analyzed

AU2606161396 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 0716 GMT 26 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 26 June (BETA)—According to research carried out by the BETA agency on the television presentation of political subjects in the first week of June, the ruling party dominated the party political scene on the screens of the state television.

From 3 June to 8 June, out of 20 items in the main daily report on RTS [Radio Television Serbia] dealing with the activities of parties, 17 items were related to the activities of the SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia], and one mentioned a joint action of the SPS and the JUL [Yugoslav United Left]. That is what was determined by Jovanka Matic, researcher at the Institute of Social Studies. In an assignment for the BETA agency, she analyzed the contents of the main informative program of the RTS, TV Politika, Studio B, and BK [Braca Karic] Television in that time period.

TV Politika did not have even one item about parties in its main informative program, "Dan," whereas Studio B and BK Television noted the activities of other political parties. Only BK Television pointed out the fact that the federal elections were coming up.

The state television devoted 18.53 minutes to the activities of the ruling party, which is more than was devoted to all other reports from around the world.

Only three other parties "passed through" the RTS news: New Democracy (0.52), the Radical Party "Nikola Pasic" (0.29), and the JUL for the Serb Republic (0.35).

On RTS, the ruling party was shown as a party on the rise, whose membership is being revived, and whose infrastructure is being strengthened (seven items spoke of the establishment of the regional party boards).

In the period from 3 June to 8 June, in the framework of the so-called party chronicle, Studio B aired 23 items about 12 parties from Serbia and four from Montenegro, which together lasted for 14.41 minutes. A little more attention was given to the SRS [Serbian Radical Party] (3 items, 3.19 minutes), and the SPS (3 items, 2.12 minutes).

Most of the parties were presented on this television station in one item (the SPO [Serb Renewal Movement], the Civic Alliance [GSS], JUL, the Radical Party "Nikola Pasic," the Social Democratic Union, and the Party of Democratic Action [SDA]) with an average length of 35 seconds. The New Democracy [ND], the Democratic Center [DC], and the SK-PJ (League of Communists-Movement for Yugoslavia) were presented with two items each. Of the party leaders, only Vuk Draskovic and Dragoljub Micunovic could be seen and heard on the screens of Studio B. Not one television item covered the parties themselves as was the case with the state television and the SPS. The items spoke of the positions of the parties regarding various social issues.

Critical remarks about the official politics were heard on Studio B on two occasions, and they were made by the leader of the SPO and the Democratic center. The method in which the party scene has been presented in no way gave the impression that the parties are facing an election competition.

The party chronicle of the BK Televsision, in its program "Levo—desno" ["Left—Right"], a kind of continuation of the information program, aired a total of 21 items about the activities of 12 Serb and three Montenegrin parties, lasting 10.49 minutes

The shortest item lasted six seconds, and the longest lasted 59 seconds. On this television station, none of the party leaders faced the viewers live. In the BK selection, none of the parties was favored (two items each on the SPS, SPO, DS [Democratic Party], and SRS, and one item each on the ND, JUL, GSS, DSS [Democratic Party of Serbia], DC, SK-PJ, SDA, and RS [Workers' Party]).

On this station, one could hear the most (four in total) items on the critical challenging of the authorities (economic policy, attitude toward crime and democracy).

In a third of the items on BK Television, Serb and Montenegrin parties mentioned the forthcoming federal elections, announcing coalition ties and insisting on democratic conditions for the holding of the elections.

Serbia

Serbia: Milosevic Receives U.S. Assistant Secretary of State

LD2606223996 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2204 GMT 26 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 26 Jun (TANJUG)—Slobodan Milosevic, president of the Republic of Serbia, received the American team headed by John Kornblum, U.S. assistant secretary of state, in Belgrade this evening.

Their talks covered current issues concerning the realization of the peace plan for Bosnia, with special emphasis on the completion of preparations for the forthcoming elections. The importance was stressed on the consistent implementation of the peace agreement and on finding the best way to normalize the situation and

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relations, and to stabilize the peace in the areas affected by the civil war.

Both sides said they expected the scheduling of the elections for 14 September to facilitate the successful move to the final phase in the implementation of the peace agreement.

Also taking part in the talks was federal Minister of Foreign Affairs Milan Milutinovic.

Montenegro

Montenegro: Djukanovic Discusses Cooperation With U.S.

AU2606202496 Belgrade DNEVNI TELEGRAF in Serbo-Croatian 22 Jun 96 p 3

[Interview with Milo Djukanovic, prime minister of Montenegro, by Jaska Jakovljevic; place and date not given: "The Montenegrin Opposition and Part of the Belgrade Press Are Trying To Devalue Every State Success"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Jakovljevic] How and why was the initiative given to open a Montenegrin office in Washington?

[Djukanovic] During the past year the assembly and government of Montenegro have intensified contacts with the U.S. Congress, State Department, and business circles, and through a systematic campaign we have managed to create conditions for a favorable climate in banking and business circles, which determine the crediting and technical support to the implementation of infrastructure projects and privatization processes. All that has resulted in the recent signing of an agreement on consulting, marketing, and development in the field of tourism. In the negotiating process there are also a number of direct investment projects from this market.

The initiative was taken from this side even during the first visit of the Montenegrin government and assembly delegation to the United States in early 1995. Of course, no concrete deals would be possible without both sides being interested. And the fact that it was the American side that first proposed to establish a joint Montenegrin-U.S. Chamber of Commerce shows that both sides are indeed interested.

[Jakovljevic] What activities are in the Washington office's "job description?"

[Djukanovic] The Washington office will be organized in the form of a permanent mission that will employ public relations experts to provide information about Montenegro, to represent its specific interests and give the necessary logistical support to the promotion of Montenegro's political and economic presentation. The joint Chamber of Commerce was founded in April and its headquarters are in New York City, on Wall Street, and judging from the initial results, it will be important for economic cooperation with business circles on the American market.

[Jakovljevic] There has been recent news in the media that a new FRY constitution is being made that will strengthen the role of the federal state and the function of the FRY president. How do you comment on that?

[Djukanovic] The advancement of the functioning of the federal state is indeed necessary, not by writing up a new constitution, but by providing more efficient and less expensive federal executive authority. The federal state does not take advantage of the potential provided in this Constitution, and every procrastination in that respect in the form of demands for creating a new constitution, which after all, has nowhere been registered, would really mean a postponement in activating and stabilizing the state's vital functions. I think that the stability and functioning of the federal state will be greatly determined by its relations with the National Bank of Yugoslavia, which, due to a number of circumstances, has taken over a major part of the federal state's functions, at the same time neglecting its own obligations in the monetary sphere. Of course, stability and functioning of the state will also greatly depend on its relations with the federal assembly which has in the past substantially slowed down the legislative development of the economic, political, and financial system of the new federal state.

[Jakovljevic] How do you comment on the reactions of the Montenegrin opposition to your meeting with the U.S. President?

[Djukonovic] Much of this criticism relates to an alleged lack of information, the covertness of my trip to the United States, or they are malicious comments which not only belittle the significance of the political talks I had with President Clinton but also question the authenticity of the meeting and even the legitimacy of my authority in conducting foreign policy.

Such reactions unfortunately are a characteristic of a narrow-minded political mentality and are a matter of personal culture and political ethics. What does create concern is the fact that the relevant statements made by various opposition leaders, as well as the reactions of one part of the press in Belgrade, confirm the rule that every successful business venture, particularly on the state level, must be degraded and confined to personal political biographies, negative of course, and almost always connected with the process of buying success.

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I am deeply convinced that the most important part of the public interprets my meeting with President Clinton as an expression of respect toward Montenegro and its people. This public is neither "confounded" by this important advancement in top-level Montenegrin-U.S. relations nor does it see the success of the government's foreign policy as a "fairy tale."

[Jakovljevic] When do you expect the U.S. oil experts?

[Djukanovic] According to my latest information, the first team of oil experts from the United States is arriving in Montenegro in mid-July. What we are talking about here is renewed cooperation with U.S. oil companies which were doing research on oil sites on the Montenegrin littoral as part of contracts dating back to 1973 and 1976 and up to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. In keeping with these contracted projects, which on our side are coordinated by a Kotor-based team from "Jugopetrol," $94 million has been invested, of which $42 million are American investments. So, we are talking about a project which in terms of funds is the biggest private foreign investment in Montenegro.

Montenegro: Bulatovic Urges Bosnian Serbs To Comply With Dayton

AU2606165796 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1445 GMT 26 Jun 96

[Statement by Montenegrin President Momir Bulatovic at news conference in Podgorica on 26 June—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Dayton agreement marks a crucial turnabout in the development of relations on the territory of the previous Yugoslavia. On the basis of this agreement, the war in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina was stopped, and the process of stabilization and normalization of the situation in the region as whole has started. The creation of a new security structure, the strengthening of the confidence measures, and the removal of the amassed problems in the region through the step-by-step policy represent the integral parts of the agreement concluded in Dayton and signed in Paris in December last year.

Owing to the exceptional importance and positive wider implications of the Dayton agreement, the concern of the entire international community that the agreement remain in force is quite clear and acceptable. So is the determination of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in accordance with its state interests, to contribute to this goal as much as possible.

It is indisputable that the Dayton agreement is guarding peace in our immediate neighborhood and ensuring the equal legal position of the entities in Bosnia-Herzegovina and that it will suspend and ultimately remove the sanctions that were introduced against the FRY.

Proceeding from these facts, the FRY leadership has had a series of contacts with the authorized representatives of the Serb Republic [RS]. Mr. Radovan Karadzic stated publicly at the time that the Dayton agreement is a document of profound interests for the RS. Similarly, Mr. Karadzic initialed the Dayton agreement in our presence. The entire international community was informed about that back in November.

I would like to remind you that an integral part of the Dayton peace package is a document entitled the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which, within the general provisions, in Article 9, states, I quote: No person serving a sentence passed by the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and no person indicted by the Tribunal or person not responding to the appeal to appear before the Tribunal can be put forward as a candidate, nor can he hold any public post in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

According to the Dayton agreement, this document became effective at the time that coincided with the increased pressure on Mr. Radovan Karadzic to leave his public and political posts.

For us in the FRY, this problem also emerged unexpectedly considering that, until recently, we had strong guarantees that the RS would meet all its obligations arising from the peace agreement. When we became aware two days ago that there were doubts in that regard among some of the RS leaders, Presidents Lilic and Milosevic and I appealed publicly against the deviations from the obligation that had been assumed earlier.

I do not want to add anything special to our publicly expressed stand, except to stress again the beliefs that any decision by the RS Assembly that differs from that demanded by the FRY can be a prelude to a wider destabilization of the situation in the region. The reimposition of sanctions on the RS would not only have an economic and social impact on its citizens, but would deeply affect the very existence of the RS, the legitimacy of their representatives, and the consolidation of the overall situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In such circumstances, the risk of a new cycle of senseless hostilities on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina would increase significantly.

The RS had appealed to the FRY to negotiate on its behalf and to take over the international-legal guarantees that were sought in the sense of meeting the obligations from the peace agreement. By doing so, the FRY has shown once again its natural interest in the stabilization of the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and its humanity

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and readiness to help all the people in trouble. However, at the same time, it has taken on a responsibility before the international community. This can best be seen in UN Security Council Resolution 1022, which regulates the issue of sanctions toward the RS and the FRY. The lifting of the sanctions against our country will happen automatically 10 days after the elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I believe that we have accomplished satisfactory results in that.

We have received guarantees that the international community appreciates highly and supports fully our devotion to the policy of peace and the development of new relations in the Balkans.

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